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Zambia is a landlocked country in central Africa with a population of 12 million people. The 
country has abundant land resources (74 million hectares, 47 percent of which is suitable for 
agriculture), favorable soils, relatively good rainfall (averaging over 1,000 mm/year) and low 
population density (6.4 ha per person) (World Bank 2006, FAO 2006). A study of regional 
integration potential in southern Africa concluded that Zambia has the natural resources to be a 
major food and agricultural producer for the region (African Development Bank 1993), but this 
potential has never been realized. One important reason for this has been the dominance of 
copper in the economy. Despite providing a livelihood to the majority of the population, as an 
export sector agriculture has always been subsidiary to mining. 
During the colonial period, agriculture was developed primarily to serve the mining 
sector. Development was limited to the areas close to the line of rail running through the copper 
belt and the capital city, Lusaka, to Livingstone (near the Victoria Falls on the Zambezi River). 
After independence, a more widespread form of development was intended, but squandering of 
the copper wealth in the first decade of independence (1964-1974), when copper prices were 
high, was followed by a long period of economic turmoil and decline after the collapse of the 
copper price in 1975 (Appendix Figure 1). A change of government at the end of 1991 resulted 
in the interventionist policies of the past being replaced by an orientation towards an open, more 
liberalized economy.  
Changes in agricultural policies started earlier, and agricultural growth has been 
relatively high since the mid-1980s. By early in the twenty-first century, the share of agriculture 
in GDP had risen to 20 percent. From the viewpoint of diversifying away from dependence on 
copper, a more significant change was the growth of agricultural exports, from $10 million in 
1987 to $222 million in 2004.
1 However, despite recent progress, agriculture is still far from 
                                            
1 Throughout the report, ‘$’ refers to US$ and uncited values and growth rates are from World Bank (2006).  
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attaining its full potential as a contributor to the economy and to the well-being of the majority 
of the population whose livelihood depends directly on it.  
In the first decade after independence, GDP grew at an average of 5.6 percent per year. 
From 1975, when the price of copper collapsed, through to 1999, average GDP growth was only 
0.6 percent. Since 2000, this has risen to 4.5 percent, and the incidence of extreme poverty has 
declined slightly to 53 percent (Government of Zambia data). The IMF estimates GDP growth of 
close to 6 percent in 2006.  
Agricultural GDP growth rates have followed a different pattern to GDP as a whole. 
From 1971 to 1984, the average annual growth of agricultural GDP was 2 percent. Thereafter, 
there were two five-year periods of much stronger growth (1985-89 at 5.3 percent and 1995-99 
at 7.7 percent). The period 1990-1994 produced an average growth of only 2.5 percent, but this 
was due to the devastating drought in 1992 (when agricultural GDP declined by one-third) and a 
severe drought in 1994 (when agricultural GDP declined by one-fifth).  
Despite these and other less significant drought episodes, agriculture’s contribution to 
GDP grew between 1985 and 2000 in real terms (see Appendix Figure 2) and as a share of total 
GDP (from 15 to 20 percent). That increased agricultural output has come principally from crops 
other than maize (c.f. Appendix Figures 2 and 3). This is further illustrated by the fact that the 
share of maize in the value of production of key crops has fallen from nearly 80 percent in the 
early 1980s to barely 50 percent by 2005 (even though the share of maize in household 
consumption has remained much more stable – c.f. Appendix Figures 4 and 5).
2    
The growth of the agricultural sector is due not only to the changes in agricultural 
incentives that are presented in this chapter. The calculations show that agricultural incentives 
have been depressed over the entire study period (1955-2005). Negative assistance to agriculture 
was particularly evident in the 1970s and 1980s, but even after the opening up of the economy in 
the 1990s, agricultural producers have generally continued to receive prices that are well below 
border equivalents. There are three main reasons for this: the direct influence of agricultural 
policies, the monopsonistic structure of agricultural markets, and the indirect but significant 
influence of macro-economic mismanagement, giving rise to the currency being almost always 
overvalued throughout the five decades covered by the study.  
                                            
2 Detailed analysis of changes in cropping mix amongst small-scale farmers is available in Zulu et al. (2000).  
 
3
As is discussed in detail later, currency misalignment is significant from the mid-1960s to 
the mid-1990s, accounting for half or more of the magnitude of the distortions in the 1970s and 
1980s. Even after the parallel market and official rates converged in the late 1990s (thereby 
eliminating currency overvaluation from the calculated distortion measures using the project’s 
chosen methodology), there is still reason to suppose that the Kwacha remained overvalued, 
depressing agricultural incentives more than has been estimated using the available data.  
While the calculations indicate that farmers were most heavily taxed in the 1970s and 
1980s, it is important to note that the common perception amongst the farming community, 
especially smallholder farmers, was that these were the glory decades for farming. Land was 
even more abundant than it is now, and trading costs were low because the state agency, 
NAMBOARD, maintained a wide network of depots from which it delivered fertilizer, seed and 
other inputs and purchased the crop at the farm gate, not at the depot. NAMBOARD, with its 
deficits met by taxpayers, absorbed the transport costs and was not seeking to make a margin on 
transactions.  
The terms of trade for farmers therefore were perceived to be relatively favorable in the 
1970s and 1980s, whereas in the 1990s and beyond farmers are of the view that they have to deal 
with ‘unscrupulous’ businessmen, many of whom are not involved in the agricultural sector on a 
long-term basis. Contrary to what might have been predicted, private marketing costs may have 
increased after liberalization; and certainly a much higher level of risk has been passed on to 
farmers.  
Over the five decades covered by the study, changes in agricultural and food policies 
have at no stage brought unambiguous improvements in the lot of the small-scale farmer. The 
extent to which agriculture and food policies have been conducive to the achievement of national 
socio-economic goals has been the subject of a number of in-depth studies.
3 The broad-brush 
picture is that the failure to achieve anything like the potential of Zambia’s agricultural sector, 
coupled with largely perverse effects of subsidies and other interventions in food markets, have 
imposed immense costs on the economy and account to a significant extent for the widespread 
persistence of poverty.  
                                            
3 See papers produced by the Food Security Research Project (FSRP), a collaboration between the Agricultural 
Consultative Forum, the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, Michigan State University and USAID in 
Lusaka. FSRP papers a down-loadable from http://www.aec.msu.edu/agecon/fs2/zambia/index.htm  
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This is not to say that some policies and actions did not aim to promote agriculture and to 
alleviate poverty. However, the pattern of public expenditure reflected misplaced priorities, 
focusing on subsidies requiring large recurrent expenditures and delivering restricted benefits 
instead of productive investments with more widespread developmental consequences. 
Channeling resources into long-term investments in infrastructure, extension and market 
development would have had a larger payoff. The recurrent expenditures also invariably 
exacerbated differentials, further entrenching dualism. Prior to independence almost all benefits 
went to European farmers, while after 1964 those subsidies and policies which did benefit 
producers also disproportionately favored farmers located close to the line of rail, who have 
better access to inputs, transport and marketing services.
4  
In recent years rapid decreases in poverty have been measured in some rural areas due to 
rapid growth in output, but this has been very unevenly distributed.
5 The liberalization of the 
maize market and the emergence of hammermills able to compete favorably with industrial mills 
on price and nutritional quality have benefitted those rural households that are net food 
purchasers plus urban households. However, the removal in the early 1990s of the maize meal 
subsidies (which had proved unsustainable in the late 1980s) coincided with the loss of 
employment associated with public sector reform and closures of manufacturing firms that were 
unable to compete with rapidly liberalized imports. Urban poverty thus rose rapidly in the early 
1990s (McCullogh, Baulch and Cherel-Robson 2001).  
 
 
Agricultural policy in the colonial period 
 
 
Commercial agriculture was started in the early years of the twentieth century to provide food to 
the copper mines and the capital city. European settler farmers were settled along the rail line 
and provided with various forms of assistance to encourage production of maize and other crops 
to the copper belt and other urban areas. Small-scale black farmers were deliberately 
                                            
4 This conclusion applies even to the effects of pan-territorial prices. See later discussion under ‘Policies behind the 
distortions’ and Jansen and Rukovo (1992). 
5 See McCullogh Baulch and Cherel-Robson (2001), Balat and Porto (2005a) and Siegel and Alwang (2005).  
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disadvantaged, not least by being given significantly lower prices for their crops. The dualistic 
agricultural structure, which constituted a basic distortion in the agricultural sector that persists 
to this day, was the result of deliberate policies initiated a century ago. 
The settler farmer production system was well established by the 1920s. The 
international depression of the 1930s sharply reduced demand for copper. In the face of falling 
demand for agricultural goods, European and African farmers suffered extreme hardship during 
that period (McPherson 2004). In 1936, the government promulgated the Maize Control 
Ordinance, which resulted in the formation of the Maize Control Board (MCB). Its mandate was 
to stimulate production of maize while protecting European farmers from competition from 
African farmers. These objectives were achieved by raising the producer price of maize above 
world market levels for sales to the ‘internal pool’, three quarters of which was reserved for 
European farmers. Additional maize was directed to the ‘external pool’ which involved sales at 
lower export parity prices (Jansen 1991). Urban consumer prices were set at much lower levels, 
with the difference being made up by substantial government subsidies to the MCB which 
mainly served urban consumers. 
World War II raised the demand for copper and hence for maize to such an extent that 
imports became necessary. Producer prices for maize for both African and European farmers 
were kept below import parity levels. While African farmers consistently received lower prices 
than European farmers, small-scale African farmers in remote areas had to contend with even 
lower net returns than their counterparts who were based within the MCB’s restricted area of 
operations (eight districts along the rail line). 
After World War II, maize production began to exceed internal demand and exports of 
maize were resumed. This trend continued during the Federal period (1953-1963), with the 
Federal Grain Marketing Board keeping producer prices above export parity levels. A 
discriminatory element was still evident, however. “Not all producers were subsidized, nor were 
they subsidized equally. The African producer price was still considerably less than the 
European producer price because the government diverted part of the proceeds from sales of 
domestic maize to an African farming improvement fund.” (Jansen 1991, p. 278). 
 
 





The main focus of the present study (Anderson et al. 2008) is to measure the extent to which 
government-imposed distortionary policies create a gap between domestic prices and what they 
would be under free markets. The objective is to have simple measures of policy-induced 
distortions to agricultural prices which are uniform and comparable across time periods and 
between countries. Since it is not possible to understand the characteristics of agricultural 
development with a sectoral view alone, the project’s methodology not only estimates the effects 
of direct agricultural policy measures (including distortions in the foreign exchange market), but 
it also generates estimates of distortions in non-agricultural sectors for comparative evaluation.
  
More specifically, this study computes a Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for farmers 
including an adjustment for direct interventions on inputs. It also generates an NRA for 
nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural tradables via the calculation 
of a Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA).  
The basis of the approach is a comparison between the prices actually received by 
producers (or paid by consumers) and the prices they would have prevailed had there been no 
policy distortions. This reflects the small country assumption that the relevant opportunity costs 
are reflected in the international border prices for the commodities adjusted for non-policy price 
wedges (transport costs, marketing margins, quality differences, etc). Where actual import and 
export prices are available, these are to be used in preference to the alternative of constructing a 
synthetic cif/fob prices from international reference prices, adjusted for transport and related 
costs. Details of the data sources and assumptions made to generate the NRAs are laid out in the 
Appendix. 
In interpreting the NRA results presented below, the reader needs to bear in mind five 
points which arise from the way the domestic to border calculations have been made (as well as 
the limitations due to the poor quality of some of the data). 
First, the wholesale level has been chosen as the point in the value chain where the ratios 
are calculated. Prior to economic liberalization, the wholesale level was constituted by the state 
marketing boards, notably (for the crops covered by this study) NAMBOARD. The calculated 
NRA measures thus apply to farmers close to the depots and would be lower (which in almost all 
years means more negative) for farmers living further away from the depots. In order to improve  
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the position of small farmers in remote areas, the network of marketing board depots was 
extended after independence into the rural areas beyond the rail line and pan-territorial pricing 
introduced.   
Second, for the period up to 1994, the wholesale prices used in the calculations are the 
minimum guaranteed prices to farmers. Those farmers able to market their products locally, or 
engage in informal cross-border trade with neighboring countries (notably the DRC and 
Malawi), would have received higher prices and hence have been subject to higher (less 
negative) NRAs than have been calculated. Even in the case of tobacco, which was sold at 
auction, the prices available for and used in this study are the floor prices which government set 
to protect farmers. In years where the floor price applied, this should be reflected in positive 
rates of assistance. 
Third, farmers who received inputs from NAMBOARD were required to sell their crops 
through the official channels, with a ‘stop order’ system ensuring that the loans due on the inputs 
were repaid. While this often may have involved low selling prices, the inputs themselves were 
typically subsidized, and the farmers nonetheless may have tried to enhance their incomes by 
selling at least part of their crops at higher prices.  
Fourth, farmers able to store their crops until later in the season usually did much better 
than farmers who were forced to sell immediately after harvest at the minimum guaranteed 
prices. Studies have shown that even small farmers are well aware of the changing prices over 
the season and try to delay sales, but typically have to sell a portion of their crops immediately 
after the harvest at the lowest prices to raise some cash (Coulter et al. 1996, Mundia 1999). Even 
where monthly producer price data are available, there is no corresponding volume data, and so 
no basis to calculate a proper weighted average price for the year. Data from a 2003 survey on 
the month when the household had the largest sales, however, suggest that most is sold in the 
early part of the marketing season. Averaging the prices alone is obviously unsatisfactory when 
there is a large range of selling prices over a particular cropping season (Appendix Figure 6).
6 
                                            
6 There are reasons to suspect that the price variations in Kabwe were particularly large in the 1998/99 season, one 
of the main ones being that the FRA imports were largely channelled to the industrial millers and did not reach the 
local markets. Much of the locally produced grain was probably sold early in the season due to farmers’ cash needs. 




And fifth, the prices used in the calculations for maize, sorghum, wheat and sunflower 
after 1994 relate to trades conducted via the Agricultural Commodity Exchange (ACE). Where 
possible, these are prices from actual sales, but in some months only bid or only offer price data 
are available. Here too there is the problem of annual average prices having to be calculated 
without weighting by sales volumes. For these crops, any apparent improvement in NRAs is 
partly due to the change from a low minimum price reference point to actual market prices 
received by farmers. ACE prices are Lusaka wholesale prices, which are the highest a farmer can 
get. All prices outside of Lusaka and the main Copperbelt towns will be lower. 
 
 
The patterns of distortions, 1955 to 2005 
 
 
The annual NRA estimates for import-competing products and exportables are illustrated in 
Figure 1, while five-year averages for individual products are shown in Table 1. Year-by-year 
data are given in Appendix Table 7. On a five-year average basis, the overall NRA results are 
very close to (within 2 to 4 percentage points of) those calculated by Jansen (1991), the Zambia 
case study in the earlier Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1991) project.
7   
Positive assistance for a decade or so after the Second World War was followed by a 
sustained half-century period of negative assistance to farmers. Policies encouraging import 
substitution of rice and wheat did result in positive NRAs for these crops for short periods (1979-
84 and 1995-96 for rice, 1981-83, 1994-96 and 2000-04 for wheat and a few other separate years 
for both commodities). Otherwise, occasional positive rates for maize, sorghum, soybeans, 
cotton and tobacco are due to coincidental upward movements in domestic prices, currency 
devaluation and/or reductions in the reference border prices (and vice-versa for negative spikes). 
These coincidental factors are absorbed in the five-year averages presented in Table 1, where the 
only positive rates are for rice (1980-84 and 1995-99) and wheat (1980-84, 1995-1999 and 2000-
04).   
                                            
7 Jansen’s full set of Nominal Rates of Protection estimates for 1966-84 are given in Table 7-7 in Jansen (1991) and 
are extended for maize, cotton and tobacco to 1990 in Table 7 of Jansen and Rukovo (1992).   
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The patterns of assistance to or taxation of agriculture are the result of the interplay of a 
number of different influences. The direct influences arise from the agricultural sector policies, 
which are discussed in detail in the next two sections. In explaining the changes in NRAs, it is 
not just the articulated policies that matter, but also the way they are implemented as reflected in 
the institutional structures, price regulations, and financial flows to the agricultural sector 
(subsidies, public sector investments, etc.). Particularly in the period since liberalization, the 
impact of these policies is tempered by the nature and structure of agricultural markets. These 
structural issues are important in explaining the pattern of assistance to Zambian farmers. 
Another key part of the explanation for the NRA pattern lies in the indirect effects of the 
macroeconomic and trade policies pursued. Detailed aspects of these are discussed below, but it 
is relevant at the outset to stress that the main macroeconomic influence is via exchange rate 
overvaluation. Using the crude measure of the parallel market premium, the Zambian Kwacha 
appears overvalued from the early 1960s to the end of the 1990s (Appendix Figure 7). In years 
where the parallel rate is way out of line with the official rate (such as 1977 or 1988), the world 
parity price in Kwacha (which appears in the denominator of the NRA formula) is much higher 
than the value calculated with the official exchange rate. The NRA values for years such as 1977 
and 1988 is thus suddenly much more negative. This results in a mirror image downward swing 
in the NRA curves, reflecting the upward swing in the exchange rate premium. Except for 
import-competing products in the 1980-84 period, the growing exchange rate overvaluation over 
the 1970s and 1980s amplifies what would be (at the official exchange rate) far more modest 
levels of negative assistance. The progressive reduction in overvaluation since the 1980s brings 
the calculated NRAs increasingly closer to what they would be had official exchange rates been 
used in the calculation.  
Over the whole period of the present study, the overall patterns which emerge are of 
increasingly negative assistance to agriculture during the periods of dirigiste control over the 
economy, which were also years of significant overvaluation of the exchange rate. Economic 
liberalization is the hallmark of the Third Republic, which started in 1992. During the 1990s, 
macro-economic stability was progressively restored and many of the former controls over the 
economy, including those pertaining to agriculture, were unwound. As is clear from Figure 1, 
these measures are less negative than in the 1980s, but they did not lead to positive NRAs for  
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agriculture, in part because government in fact adopted a half-hearted approach to liberalizing 
agricultural markets.  
Fertilizer and maize markets provide two key examples where the government did not 
completely move out, and where full liberalization is yet to occur. However, consumers did 
benefit from increased competition in the more liberalized market environment, this resulting in 
lower processing and marketing margins. Ministry of Agriculture data show that real maize meal 
prices had a downward trend, while real grain prices remained virtually stable between 1990 and 
2005.  
 
NRAs by commodity 
 
Maize constitutes an average of two thirds of the total value of the commodities being studied 
and hence the maize NRA to a large degree determines the overall average NRA for agriculture 
as a whole. The NRA for maize suggests producer prices have been between one-fifth and two-
thirds below what they would be in an open-economy environment, peaking at -68 percent in 
1985-89. The other traded cereal crops (sorghum, wheat and rice) generally have very large 
negative five-year average NRAs, but in some periods they reverse to low negative or even 
positive values. In the most recent ten years, the government has had a 15 percent import duty on 
wheat, to compensate those farmers who have invested in wheat production but face high costs 
of fuel and electricity compared with competitor wheat producers. 
Amongst the traded oilseeds, the NRA for groundnuts is severely and consistently 
negative, with soybeans also always negative but less severely so in the last decade. The NRAs 
for the export cash crops, cotton and tobacco, tend also to be large and negative up to 1990, the 
worst period being 1985-1989. Even in the most recent period, 2000-2004, tobacco NRAs are 
still very negative (Burley -58 percent, Virginia -29 percent), as is the NRA for cotton (-51 
percent). 
 
Assistance patterns for tradable products and for agriculture as a whole 
 
The patterns for import-competing products and exportables both follow the overall pattern of 
exchange rate misalignment. Thus the largest negative NRA values for both were in 1985-1989,  
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followed by 1975-1979, with a continuous improvement for import-competing products since 
1990. For any particular commodity, a change from import-competing to exportable would tend 
to make its NRA less negative because the cif import price is almost always higher than the fob 
export price. Ceterus paribus, the average NRA for import-competing products might be 
expected to be more negative than the average NRA for exportables, but this is not the case for 
Zambia. The reason is that in the weighted average across all import-competing products there is 
a preponderance of import-competing foodstuffs which (via relatively higher producer prices) 
are less taxed than exportable cash crops. By 2000-2004, the NRA for import-competing 
products improves to -10 percent while the exportables’ NRA becomes even more negative than 
in the 1995-99 period (-53 percent as compared with -46 percent). 
The third-to-last row of Table 1 gives the weighted average rates of assistance for all of 
the commodities covered in this study. This is the same as the first row in Table 2. When the 
guesstimated NRAs for non-covered products (which account for between one-sixth and one-
quarter of the gross value of farm production) and for non-product-specific agricultural subsidies 
are included, the sector’s negative NRA is considerably reduced. The tradables part of 
agriculture is more discriminated that the nontradables part though. By contrast, the tradables 
part of non-agriculture has a positive weighted average NRA, with trade taxes and distortions to 
the exchange rate assisting import-competing producers more than they are hurting exporters 
(mainly the mining sector). Thus the relative rate of assistance (RRA) is more negative than the 
NRA for agricultural tradables (Figure 2 and Table 2).
8   
The growth in agriculture’s contribution to GDP and exports took off with a lag 
following the changing levels of disincentives to agriculture, that is, not until the early 1990s 
(Appendix Figure 2). The most significant development was the growth of floriculture and 
horticulture, whose exports contributed significantly to the impressive rise in overall agricultural 
exports, from under US$ 20 million in the late 1980s to over US$ 150 million per annum in the 
new millennium. That represents an annual growth rate of more than 30 percent. But note that 
                                            
8 Given the many assumptions behind the RRA calculations, weight needs to be given to the direction of change 
from the NRA numbers rather than the absolute magnitudes. In particular, the data on subsidies are not complete or 
consistent over the whole period. After 1990, subsidies throughout the economy were sharply reduced but in 
agriculture there was a continuation of some subsidies, particularly in 1992 and 1993, to counter the effects of the 
extreme drought. There was also significant support to the agricultural sector via the large Agriculture Sector 
Investment Project (ASIP) over the period 1994 to 2001. In the new millennium, subsidies to agriculture have been 
increased again, notably on fertilizers and other inputs.   
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floriculture and horticulture – whose NRAs have not been estimated – enjoyed special assistance 
in terms of duty drawback arrangements on imported equipment and a zero rating VAT status 
(claiming VAT on inputs without being charged VAT on output sold in the domestic market). 
This rapid export growth occurred alongside negative NRAs for the export crops covered in this 
study. Had these new industries been included, the estimated NRA for agriculture as a whole 
would have been somewhat less negative. 
Had the exchange rate not been distorted, the agricultural NRAs and RRA would have 
been only slightly less negative (bottom rows of Table 2), suggesting that that is not the major 
reason for the anti-agricultural and anti-trade bias.  
 
Consumer tax equivalent patterns 
 
In this study, the NRAs and CTEs are calculated at the wholesale level. Consequently, it is only 
when farmers or consumers receive direct product price subsidies that the calculated primary 
producer NRA will differ from the CTE. In the case of Zambia, there are no such subsidies (only 
farm input subsidies) and thus the primary product CTE is always numerically identical to the 
corresponding NRA. The negative assistance to the primary producer is mirrored by an implicit 
subsidy of the same magnitude for the consumer. In a country where the power base of the ruling 
party is drawn from the urban areas, it is not surprising that agricultural pricing policies should 
have produced this result.  
The only processed product for which the data exists to do a separate CTE calculation at 
the retail level is maize meal. Roller meal has been chosen as the benchmark product and the 
results are presented in Figure 3. The basic data used for the CTE maize calculation are the 
wholesale producer price and the cif import price of maize. For the roller meal CTE calculation, 
the numerator is the maize price plus processing and wholesale margins, while the denominator 
is the cif price of maize meal. The subsidy is calculated as the theoretical price of roller meal 
(the wholesale price of maize adjusted for the extraction rate, processing, wholesale and retail 
margins) as compared with the actual retail price as given by Central Statistics Office data for 
roller meal. The wholesale and retail margins are assumed fixed at 12 percent and 8 percent, 
respectively, while the processing margin is assumed to be 24 percent before liberalization and  
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to adjust from 1993 so that the retail price reflects the fact that consumer subsidies were no 
longer provided by government.  
Given these assumptions, Figure 3 suggests that, in the 1970s and 1980s, the CTE for 
maize meal was even more favorable to consumers than the CTE for maize grain. From 1991, 
however, the results suggest that the implicit consumer subsidy to maize meal has been less than 
that available for maize grain, with the graph moving into the positive range (an implicit 
consumer tax) in 1994, 1998 and 2003. The consumer subsidy graph shows how hazardous 
calculations of this sort are. This estimation approach produces plausible results in most years 
(cumulated margins dropping from 50 percent to 33 percent as a result of liberalization) but also 
some aberrant years (1989 and 1992). There are also implausible processing margins (in 1996, 
1999 and 2001). This reflects the fact that these calculations are made for the industrial millers, 
whereas many consumers switched to buying maize grain and having it milled by small hammer-
mills at a more modest cost (see below). 
 
 
Policies behind the distortions: the period to 1991 
 
 
At independence in 1964, there were high hopes for Zambia. Per capita incomes then averaged 
three times those of South Korea, copper prices were high, and the new government was 
committed to using copper wealth to raise education and living standards and diversify the 
economy. By the end of the Second Republic in 1991, the economy was in crisis with zero 
growth in GDP, savings and investment at low levels (8.4 percent and 11 percent of GDP, 
respectively), shortages of basic goods, inflation in triple digits, the budget deficit (excluding 
grants) at 16.2 percent of GDP, and debt service the equivalent of 66 percent of export revenues 
(Robinson 2004). Poverty was widespread with 58 percent of the population deemed to be living 






After independence in 1964, it was expected that policies would be put in place to significantly 
enhance the position of black farmers. President Kaunda responded to calls to boost small-scale 
agriculture by announcing a “fair price” policy for agriculture. But as McPherson (2004, p. 306) 
put it, “Though originally intended to raise the prices received by African producers, the 
initiative quickly became a ‘low price’ policy designed to reduce the cost of staple food for 
urban workers.” This pro-urban bias, reflecting the base of political support for the ruling party, 
set the tone for pricing in the Kaunda era which lasted until the end of 1991. However, to keep 
farmers from becoming politically agitated, low producer prices were offset somewhat by the 
provision by government of subsidized farm inputs. 
In the first year of independence, the world price of copper rose by 50 percent and copper 
prices remained high throughout the so-called First Republic (1964-1973). Despite the problems 
associated with the imposition of international sanctions on the post-1965 illegal regime in 
Rhodesia, economic conditions in independent Zambia were buoyant initially. Output of 
agricultural commodities increased, though rather modestly. The five- year moving average of 
total cereal production increased from 740,000 tonnes in 1964 to 850,000 tonnes in 1969 and 
over 1,000,000 tonnes by 1974 (FAO data). This is equivalent to only 3.1 percent pa growth, 
while the average population growth rate over the decade was 3.4 percent pa.  
One of the main strategies adopted by the government to pursue its agenda of 
diversifying away from copper and creating greater social equity was to have greater direct 
control over the economy. After 1968, a vigorous program of nationalization was launched 
through which the government acquired a majority stake in many large private enterprises and 
also created a number of new parastatals. This shifted the locus of economic decision-making 
decisively to the public sector, while at the same time the government became progressively 
more interventionist in its approach to economic policy-making. In the agricultural sector, the 
setting of producer and consumer prices for agricultural commodities became the norm, while 
trade policy came to be characterized by import licensing, foreign exchange allocation and 
quantitative import controls.  
The start of the Second Republic in 1973 was marked by the formal introduction of a 
one-party state. In the aftermath of the 1973 global oil crisis, there was a collapse of commodity 
markets. The copper price fell sharply (by 40 percent in 1975), while at the same time the price 
of fuel and other key imports rose sharply. Copper prices in real terms have never returned to the  
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high levels of the first decade of Zambia’s independence (although they are coming close in the 
present boom period). In the mid-1970s the government assumed that low copper prices would 
be a temporary phenomenon and did not therefore seek to fundamentally change the patterns of 
consumption and production in the economy. In the short-term, however, levels of imports had to 
be sharply reduced, GDP growth turned negative, government revenues fell sharply, inflation 
and domestic debt rose. More significantly, Zambia began to accumulate significant levels of 
external debt which henceforth became a major restraining factor in macro-economic policy-
making.  
The introduction of the one-party state in 1973 heralded an intensification of the dirigiste 
tendencies in economic management which had been evident in the early years of independence. 
As macro-economic and balance of payments problems grew, the government increasingly 
turned to donors for assistance. The government’s orientation ran counter to donor policy 
prescriptions, particularly those of the World Bank and the IMF. This resulted in a succession of 
half-hearted reform attempts in the 1980s, interspersed by populist measures intended to head off 
growing political discontent. 
The clearest example of such populism is provided by the heavy commitment to 
consumer subsidies of maize meal. The budgetary requirements for these subsidies grew to 
proportions which by the mid-1980s destabilized the national budget. When the price of 
breakfast meal was doubled in December 1986, there were riots on the Copperbelt and the 
increases were hastily withdrawn. In May 1987, President Kaunda announced a break with the 
Bretton Woods Institutions and the introduction of a home-grown recovery program, but this did 
not last. By 1989, the country had negotiated a Policy Framework Paper with the World Bank 
and the IMF. Devaluation, removal of price controls and institutional reform followed.  
In the food sector, this involved a tripling of the maize price, offset by the introduction of 
a coupon system to provide a targeted subsidy, and the scrapping of the parastatal marketing 
organization (NAMBOARD). This led in June 1990, to fresh maize meal riots, in which 19 
people died, and a coup attempt. An opposition party emerged soon after, and it was legalized in 
time to contest the October 1991 elections. The maize meal subsidy was increased again before 
the election, but this did not prevent the defeat of President Kaunda’s party. 
 




At independence in 1964, the new government’s agriculture and food policies were shaped by 
concerns about equity and food self-sufficiency. Equity required increasing the involvement of 
small-scale farmers in the market economy, while the food concerns revolved around feeding the 
rapidly growing urban population. These objectives had immediate in-built tensions for food 
prices, which were always biased towards the urban workers who constituted the bedrock of the 
ruling party’s power base. The agricultural measures the government adopted to offset low 
producer prices were to broaden the range of agricultural services (credit, fertilizer, tractor 
ploughing, marketing provided at subsidized rates) and to extend these throughout the country, 
most visibly through expanding the network of the Agricultural Rural Marketing Board (ARMB) 
depots. This did have some positive equity impacts, increasing the participation of households in 
remote areas in producing for the market.  
Uniform pan-territorial pricing, introduced in the 1974-75 crop season, gave further 
assistance to farmers in surplus-producing provinces not near the rail line who had hitherto had 
to meet the high cost of transport to urban markets. It penalized, however, farmers in deficit 
areas who received lower prices than they would have done. Under the old system, they sold 
their crops locally at prices above the national average, but they now had to sell at the pan-
territorial price. Uniform pricing was billed as being synonymous with equity, but analysis of the 
consequences indicates that the opposite had been the case. “Uniform pricing depressed the price 
received by the poorest segment of the population, i.e., farmers in the distant (non-border) deficit 
areas and has inflated the price received by better-off (and more politically vocal) farmers in 
surplus regions, particularly the Eastern province” (Jansen and Rukovo 1992). Pan-territorial and 
pan-seasonal pricing encouraged the production of maize in areas not suited to the crop and also 
greatly increased the transport costs that had to be covered by subsidies to NAMBOARD, which 
had taken over the ARMB marketing depot network.
9 Combined with consumer subsidies on 
maize meal, fertilizer subsidies and smaller subsidies for other crops, the fiscal requirements of 
agricultural subsidies grew to be a significant drain on national resources, reaching a peak of 6.7 
percent of GDP in 1980 (McPherson 2004). 
                                            
9 Jansen (1991) cites a linear programming transport model exercise as demonstrating that transport costs increased 
20 percent as a result of pan-territorial pricing.  
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In addition to maize, minimum producer prices were set for the other major crops, and it 
is these prices which have been used for the NRA calculations. Jansen (1991) notes that these 
prices were set on the basis of costs of production and were always well below border equivalent 
levels, with partially compensating direct assistance being given to farmers in the form of 
subsidies on inputs and transport. The producer prices were adjusted to influence crop choice 
vis-à-vis maize, the prices of other crops being depressed when greater encouragement to maize 
production was felt necessary and vice versa. Parastatal procurement agencies had a mix of legal 
and de facto monopsonistic control over primary agricultural markets and were either inefficient 
(in the case of groundnuts, for example) or enjoyed high rents from the low farm-gate prices (in 
the case of cotton)
10. Tobacco was marketed via an auction, but the government provided a floor 
price to encourage farmers to produce tobacco without the risk of prices being below costs of 
production in poor years.  
 
Macro and exchange rate policy 
 
While the above agriculture and food policies were becoming entrenched, poor macroeconomic 
policies following the crisis induced by the dramatic fall in the world copper price in 1975 
plunged the country into persistent internal and external imbalance. Appendix Figure 7 showing 
the parallel market premium over the official exchange rate provides one visual illustration of 
this.  
Following the rise in imported petroleum prices in 1973 and the subsequent copper price 
crash in 1975, Zambia’s macro-economic problems were induced by failure to adjust the 
exchange rate in the face of high inflation, this leading to falling export receipts. Increasing 
reliance was then placed on quantitative restrictions and tariffs to restrain imports, and 
increasingly levels of foreign borrowing were undertaken in order to sustain import levels. When 
borrowings from international private banks dried up, the government was forced to approach 
the Bretton Woods institutions for assistance.  
Over the next decade, the economic reform promises that were made were never fully 
supported by the political elite, and the result was a series of failed reform programs and surges 
                                            
10 For details, see Jansen (1988).  
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and withdrawals of foreign aid. The first of these was an Extended Fund Facility granted by the 
IMF in 1981 and discontinued in 1982. The Memorandum of Development Objectives and 
Policies agreed with the World Bank in early 1983 included increased prices of maize meal and 
fertilizer and flexibility in setting other prices (subject to ex-post review) as well as significant 
macro-economic and trade policy reforms, but the Bank suspended disbursements in October 
1983 when the government fell into arrears after unilaterally suspending debt payments.  
After the 1983 elections, President Kaunda promulgated an intensified version of the 
economic reforms, but the policy improvements had to contend with a further slide in copper 
prices, drought, and a dip in aid. Popular dissatisfaction with economic conditions led to student 
riots in February 1984 and industrial unrest in the first half of 1985. In response, financial 
policies were relaxed, thereby aggravating Zambia’s fiscal and external debt problems, leading 
to a fresh appraisal of the government’s policy stance. 
In October 1985, a comprehensive structural adjustment program was launched. This 
included a foreign currency auction which resulted in rapid depreciation of the Kwacha. Food 
prices rose dramatically as a result of the depreciation and reduction in subsidies, leading to the 
food riots referred to earlier in December 1986. This incident led to policy reversals, including 
the suspension of the foreign exchange auction in early 1987 and full-scale repudiation of the 
structural adjustment program on May Day 1987, at which a home-grown program was 
announced. However, by October 1987, the government had re-opened discussions with the 
World Bank and there was a gradual return to structural adjustment measures over the period 
1988-1990. Exchange rate policy remained central: the Kwacha was devalued and a new foreign 
exchange auction system was introduced (more to allocate foreign currency than to set the rate). 
Exporter retention schemes and (from 1989) a formal multiple exchange rate system became 
operational.
11  
In 1989, all consumer prices except maize were decontrolled and NAMBOARD was 
abolished. The fiscal burden of maize subsidies was reduced through tripling of the maize price 
and introduction of a coupon system to allow for targeting of the remaining maize subsidy. The 
country was still cut off from assistance from the multilateral institutions, but the positive 
                                            
11 For most of the time this was in operation, the surrender requirement on exporters was 50 percent of their export 
proceeds with the other 50 percent being sold at parallel market rates. These are the values used in the spreadsheet. 
The multiple exchange rate system was unwound in 1992 with full unification of the exchange rate by early 1993.  
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measures taken in respect of exchange rates and subsidy reductions paved the way for a Policy 
Framework Paper to be agreed in 1989 and relations to be restored in early 1990. In the run-up to 
the elections, adjustment was, however, abandoned one last time by the Kaunda government. 
Expansionary fiscal measures included increases in wages and in maize and other subsidies. 
President Kaunda’s United Independence Party (UNIP) was nonetheless defeated in the October 




Policies behind the distortions: the period since 1992 
 
 
The new government of President Chiluba committed itself to the program that its predecessor 
had negotiated and then abandoned. Donors pledged extensive support, including substantial 
food aid to counter the effects of the 1991-92 drought, which was of a once-in-a-century 
severity. The government acted swiftly on several economic policy fronts, particularly the 
exchange rate and trade liberalization. The foreign exchange auction was broadened, bureaux de 
change were introduced in September 1992 and this led to the unification of the exchange rate by 
December 1992. Export bans (except for ivory, oil, maize and fertilizers) were removed and all 
imports, bar a small negative list, were liberalized by September 1992. Import tariff rates were 
reduced to 6 levels in the 1991 budget, with the new minimum and maximum rates being set at 
15 percent and 50 percent respectively and the number of duty exempt goods was reduced. These 
changes resulted in a dramatic opening up of the economy to imports, not least from neighboring 
countries, which enjoyed 70 percent preferences (rising to 100 percent in later years) under 
COMESA and bilateral agreements.  
The outcome was positive in terms of greatly improved availability of basic goods but 
not without large-scale closures of businesses and loss of jobs, particularly in the manufacturing 
sector. The social impact of the loss of employment could have been mitigated by a more gradual 
approach being adopted. The pace and sequencing of trade and other economic reforms have also 




been criticized (for example by Botchwey et al. 1998) as being a major cause of the persistent 
instability of the macro-economy throughout the 1990s. The period was characterized by high 
inflation, a volatile and generally overvalued exchange rate, high real interest rates and a 
banking system oriented to financing the government deficit rather than servicing the credit 
needs of productive enterprises. The long delay in the privatization of the copper mines was 
extremely costly both within the copper sector itself and in undermining the pro-growth 
orientation the Chiluba government supposedly stood for.  
Overall, the economic environment in the 1990s was not conducive to fulfilling one of 
the basic intentions of the new government, namely that private investment would spearhead 
economic growth. The fact that non-traditional exports, including agricultural exports, grew 
significantly over the period, is claimed as contrary evidence. A more pertinent question arises 
from the counterfactual – by how much more would the non-traditional exports have grown if 
there had been an environment truly conducive to private sector growth?
12 
The pattern of growth of agricultural exports provides interesting perspectives on this 
question. The removal of exchange controls, improvement in input supplies, opening of markets 
and improvement in transport services did encourage an expansion of agricultural exports, but 
the persistence of negative NRAs for the main agricultural commodities, particularly 
exportables, can be interpreted as primae facia evidence that agricultural exports could have 
grown even faster than they did in the 1990s. The agricultural sub-sectors exhibiting the most 
dramatic growth – floriculture and horticulture –involved very few farmers who, having gained 
access to European markets, exploited them by insulating their operations from domestic policy 
changes through establishing offshore arrangements for inputs and spare parts (McPherson 
2004). In particular, they benefited from duty drawback arrangements and VAT zero rating and 
can be said to have grown to a significant extent because of the policy environment.
13  
Growth in exports of traditional agricultural products, on the other hand, together with 
growth in processed food exports (notably maize meal exports to the DRC), were rather more “in 
spite of” than “because of” the policy environment.
14 Much the same can be said of other 
                                            
12 These issues are discussed in more detail in Robinson (2004). 
13 More recently, floriculture and horticulture have experienced declines.  Sugar, cotton and tobacco have exhibited 
more sustained growth 
14 Between 1987 and 2003, the bulk of non-traditional exports were primary agricultural products (33 percent), 
floriculture and horticulture (23 percent), processed food (20 percent) and textiles (20 percent).  
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changes in the agricultural sector. At first gloss, a good deal was achieved very soon after the 
new government came to power in fulfilling its stated commitment to government withdrawing 
from direct intervention in the agriculture sector. In the midst of the drought and large imports of 
food that this required, maize meal and fertilizer subsidies were removed. Various agricultural 
reform programs were launched in 1992-1993, notably those targeted at liberalization of maize, 
agricultural input markets and agricultural credit schemes. In 1995, the milling industry was 
privatized and the World Bank-led Agricultural Sector Investment Program (ASIP) was initiated. 
However, these reform programs were not carried through with the vigor that was needed 
to produce the required results. The government commissioned a Maize Marketing Study that 
recommended that the government should fully withdraw from maize and fertilizer marketing 
and retain only a small role in establishing an agency to hold modest stocks for food security 
purposes. The Food Reserve Agency (FRA) was duly established in 1996, but soon was required 
to take on additional roles. The justification given for extending its mandate is that the private 
sector response to the government’s withdrawal from input supply and marketing had been 
inadequate. This is ironic, because the supposedly poor response is clearly a result of continued 
intervention by the public sector and the associated unpredictability and risks that this involves 
for private entities.
15 
The resources associated with agricultural credit schemes initiated by the new 
government were used inefficiently and/or misappropriated, so that the objectives of the schemes 
were thwarted. The fate of the marketing and fertilizer credits made available to lending 
institutions in 1992/93 and 1993/94 were subject to a special investigation commissioned by the 
Minister of Finance (Brown 1995). The Agricultural Credit Management Program launched in 
1994 suffered a similar fate of being poorly implemented, giving rise to high administrative 
costs, low credit recovery and corruption. McPherson (2004) concludes that the principal 
function of agricultural credit in Zambia has been to redistribute wealth to relatively well-off 
farmers, rather than to expand agricultural output. 
The Agriculture Sector Investment Program (ASIP), which was supposed to be a 
landmark example of a coordinated multi-donor sector-wide approach, unifying 180 separate 
                                            
15 Specific examples of the government’s stop-go approach and the resulting increasing intrusion of the public 
sector have been documented in, for example, Jayne et al (1999), Govereh et al. (2002), IMCS (2003), Mwanaumo 
et al. (2005), Siegel and Alwang (2005).  
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donor-funded projects, has also largely been deemed to be a failure. The World Bank itself, 
through its Operations Evaluation Department, rates the outcome as unsatisfactory, sustainability 
unlikely and institutional development modest (World Bank 2003). These ratings are with 
respect to the original objectives - improve household food security, make better use of natural 
resources, generate employment, raise incomes and increase exports – ‘which were not 
achieved’. The project was later restructured, but even the scaled down project failed at the time 
to achieve most of its revised targets.   
In the light of the recent developments of the sector, however, it would appear that ASIP 
has been more successful than had earlier been appeared to be the case. Firstly, the agriculture 
sector experience impressive growth of exports and sector has shown reasonably good average 
growth rates throughout 2000s despite drought in 2001/02 season, suggesting perhaps some 
positive lag effects. On sustainability, the ASIP created the Agricultural Consultative Forum 
(ACF) which is still active and one of the leading think-tanks which facilitates policy dialogue 
between the Ministry of Agriculture and sectoral stake holders. Thirdly, the Rural Investment 
Fund (RIF), which was the largest component of the ASIP, is still active and continues to 
facilitate investments into rural infrastructure. Recent field visits by World Bank staff have 
reportedly shown that many infrastructure facilities which were initially built under RIF and 
were dormant during early 2000s are coming back to productive use (small dams and 
sheds/storage facilities) and some are developed even further by local communities (i.e. 
development of small-scale irrigation schemes). Finally, ASIP managed to scale down the 
Ministry of Agriculture and focus it on core functions, although the latter has been hampered 
more recently by fertilizer subsidy programs and FRA maize market interventions, which have 
crowded out agriculture budget for core functions.
16 
In the new millennium, there was another change in government. After serving two 
terms, President Chiluba was not eligible to stand in the elections in 2001. Following some 
controversy over the conduct and results of the elections, President Mwanawasa came to power, 
representing the same party as President Chiluba. There have not therefore been any dramatic 
shifts in policy in recent years. The macro-economy has continued to improve and GDP growth 
has picked up significantly to 5-6 percent per year.  
                                            
16 This is discussed further below in the concluding ‘Prospects for Future Reform’  
 
23
In respect of agricultural policies, the Mwanawasa government has made a few positive 
steps in response to criticisms of the weaknesses and inconsistencies of the agricultural 
liberalization to date, but has also taken some backward steps. On the positive side, it has 
acceded to the arguments against the formation of a Crop Marketing Authority (e.g., Nijhoff et 
al. 2003) and has accepted that intervention should be limited to the more restricted roles 
established for the Food Reserve Agency. On the negative side, the government has used a tariff 
review in 2005 to raise border tariffs on agricultural goods
17 and continues to depress private 
sector involvement in maize marketing by continuing (through the FRA) pan-territorial pricing 
and procurement and by injecting uncertainty about export bans, tariff waivers, public sector 
import levels and subsidies when there is a maize shortfall.
18  
The main specific policy change has been to increase the level of maize and fertilizer 
subsidies. Producers have also benefited from a more certain policy environment, as there has 
been increased consistency in policy. Despite the inherent policy inadequacies, the so-called 
‘new deal’ government has not made different pronouncements during its tenure. Participants in 
the agricultural sector have thus learnt how to deal with the inadequacies in a relatively stable 
environment free of the uncertainties associated with policy shifts. 
Despite the agricultural policy environment since 1992 not being as open and growth-
oriented as had initially been expected, there have been some notable positive changes which 
have benefited small-scale farmers and poor consumers. Two sectors illustrate this point. First, 
removal of subsidies and other aspects of maize liberalization undermined the monopolistic 
position of the large milling companies, making it profitable for small hammermills to produce 
maize meal, often on a service milling basis (charging a fee to producers or to maize-deficit 
households able to buy grain or obtain it through food aid sources). Not only is the cost of the 
maize meal from hammermills significantly cheaper than the commercial product (Jayne et al. 
                                            
17 Using the GTAP product classifications, between 2003 and 2005 the applied Zambian import tariffs have gone up 
as follows: paddy rice from 4.6 percent to 15 percent, wheat from 5 percent to 10 percent, cereal grains from 4.8 
percent to 12.4 percent and oilseeds from 4.5 percent to 5.6 percent (WITS database). 
18 Mwanaumo et al. (2005) document the significant direct costs involved in public sector prevarication in response 
to the 2005 maize shortfall (such as fourth quarter imports costing $256 and $320 per tonne, as compared with $210 
and lower transport costs if the maize had been purchased in June). The authors also allude to the long-term costs of 






(1999) estimate 20-30 percent cheaper), it is also (in its straight run or mugaiwa form) more 
nutritious (Mwiinga et al. 2002). A 1997 study estimates that there were at least 5,000 
hammermills in the country, by that time providing a significantly cheaper source of mealie meal 
while also employing 10,000 people. In addition, “the presence of the hammermill has been 
reported to have stimulated increased crop production” (Temba 1997). 
Second, in the case of cotton, the dissolution of LINTCO and its replacement by a variety 
of purchasers of seed cotton has been associated with a dramatic rise in the production of seed 
cotton (from 48,000 MT in 1993 to 144,000 in 2004, according to the Central Statistics Office). 
Unlike other export crops which grew rapidly in the 1990s (fresh flowers and sugar), cotton is 
primarily a smallholder crop. “Its potential role in poverty alleviation and food security is thus 
very large” (Tschirley Zulu and Shaffer 2004). 
Neither of these positive developments is reflected in the above NRA calculations. In the 
case of maize and maize meal, the data used is for commercial operations, while in the case of 
cotton the calculated NRAs are simply not consistent with developments in the sector. This may 
well be due to the monopsonistic structure of the industry.
19 After liberalization, LINTCO gave 
way to several cotton companies but they operate in restricted areas, in effect having local 
monopsonies. However, unlike similar companies in other countries, the Zambian cotton 
companies sell inputs to farmers at cost, preferring to make their margin on the product side. The 
approach of the companies was to create order and predictability and this has paid off in terms of 
increased production. Cotton and tobacco production expanded also because they were profitable 
relative to other crops. Maize production was adversely affected by the dissolution of 
NAMBOARD and many small-scale producers reduced their maize areas and started growing 
cotton and tobacco (Tschirley, Zulu and Shaffer 2004). 
The unexpectedly negative post-1991 NRA results for most of the commodities studied 
(especially exportables) may also in part be that the monopsonistic buying that is evident in the 
cotton sector is also present in the purchase of cereal and oilseed crops. Despite the fact that 
there are many buyers of those crops and not just a small number of big companies, the buyers 
nonetheless operate in specific localities, where competition is limited.  
                                            
19 This would not be unique to Zambia. See “Why liberalization did not lead to price competition in Zimbabwe” in 
Goreux (2003, Section 2.6).  
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Furthermore, the buyers would be aware of the cash needs of farmers and would 
therefore offer the lowest prices just after the harvest, accepting that somewhat higher prices 
would have to be paid later in the season, but with the average for the year being very low 
relative to border prices.  
Analogous market stickiness must also exist in trades involving large-scale producers, 
even those using the Agricultural Commodities Exchange. This is because in theory producer 
prices should rise to match border prices, and in so doing there would be strong incentives for 
increased production of the affected crops and hence rapid growth of the agricultural sector. This 
has not happened. To the extent that this can be attributed to market imperfections, the difference 
could be labeled as a “market imperfection margin”. Assuming the most recent five-year period 
(2001-2005) to be the most liberal, for Zambia the results suggest that this margin may have 
averaged across all crops as much as 30 percent gross or 25 percent net of input subsidies, even 
including a positive NRA for a major import-competing product (wheat). The market 




Prospects for further reform 
 
 
In the last five-year period covered, with the sole exception of wheat, all the NRA estimates for 
our covered products remain stubbornly negative (Table 1). If the levels of distortion are to be 
reduced in the future, attention will have to be given to both microeconomic and macroeconomic 
factors. The changes in government positions that are needed are to shift expenditure priorities in 
agriculture from short-term recurrent subsidies to long-term investments, to promote the 
development of competitive private-sector involvement in input supply and marketing, and to 
ensure a competitive exchange rate to enhance the profitability of traded agricultural 
commodities. 
                                            
20 The conundrum of negative NRAs after liberalization is even more difficult to explain to the extent that the 
Kwacha arguably remained overvalued after the liberalization of the foreign exchange market, yet our NRA 
estimates assume it has been in equilibrium since 1992. The possibility of the Kwacha being overvalued when it is 
‘market determined’ is denied by the IMF and the Bank of Zambia. However, when monetary and international  
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As regards government expenditure on agriculture, the present policy is biased towards 
short-term, high-visibility expenditures which have obvious political pay-offs but do nothing to 
overcome structural weaknesses in the agricultural sector. Thus of the Kw 650 billion allocated 
to agriculture in 2006, over 30 percent (Kw 199 billion) was for fertilizer subsidies. The present 
expenditure pattern is seasonal, exposed to drought and has poor returns. As concluded in a 
recent study on the poverty-reducing potential of smallholder agriculture, what is required is a 
comprehensive and holistic long-term approach to rural development, ‘not just an agricultural or 
commodity-specific strategy’ (Siegel and Alwang 2005). Government expenditure should thus 
be directed to higher investment in social payoff such things as roads, energy, water, 
telecommunications, and agricultural research and extension.
21  
In respect of building the capacity of the private sector, the government needs to 
recognize that its own activities often undermine the private sector in a counter-productive 
fashion. In areas close to the rail line it should be profitable for the private sector to supply 
inputs and market production, but in practice private operators often find their efforts being 
undercut by cheaper inputs supplied by the public sector and higher prices being paid to 
purchase crops. Parallel, subsidized delivery systems in the districts along the line of rail are 
suppressing commercial investments.  
The government would do better to revert to targeting subsidies to areas that are difficult 
for the private sector to serve due to underdeveloped infrastructure and sparse populations. In a 
recent Food Security Research Project study, districts in which at least 25 percent of sampled 
households purchased fertilizer from commercial outlets were all along the line of rail. Subsidies 
could be provided to households in more remote districts by adopting incentive-based subsidy 
mechanisms, similar to those that are now commonly used in infrastructure sectors to leverage 
private sector capital and skills into serving remote areas. Such output-based aid approaches, or 
‘smart’ subsidies, involve potential private operators bidding to provide specified services, and 
the bidder requiring the lowest level of subsidy is given the tender. Mechanisms for monitoring 
implementation and penalizing non-performance would be needed though. 
                                                                                                                                             
reserve policies are taken into account, one estimate, for the period 1996-2000 suggests that the Kwacha was 60 
percent overvalued (Robinson 2004). 
21 Similarly, Balat and Porto (2005a) conclude that while expanded trade opportunities in crops such as cotton, 
tobacco and hybrid maize offer the prospect of significantly higher rural incomes, these gains will not materialize 
without ‘complementary polices, like the provision of infrastructure, credit, and extension services’.  
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Finally, as regards the macro economy, it has to be recognized that despite the 
liberalizations of the past 15 years and the consequent diversification that has occurred, copper 
still remains the lead sector in Zambia’s economy, particularly in terms of foreign currency 
generation. The key macroeconomic issues at present are the level and variability of the 
exchange rate. With the reduction of Zambia’s external debt, resumption in confidence, as 
exemplified by foreign purchases of government securities, and the copper price rising steeply 
(from $1,560/MT in 2002 to over $8,000/MT in 2006), the nominal exchange rate has 
appreciated 60 percent between June 2005 and June 2006, with the real appreciation being even 
larger than this. The exchange rate keeps moving, however, for example from Kw 2,900 in mid-
June to Kw 4,000 to the US$ in mid-August. Appreciation of the Kwacha and variability of the 
exchange rate pose significant threats to the sustainability of the recent achievements in 
increasing agricultural and other non-traditional exports.  
As highlighted above, the government with the support of the IMF is treating the 
appreciated exchange rate as a valid measure of the opportunity cost of foreign currency. In 
contrast, other major copper exporters, such as Chile, are attempting to limit the Dutch disease 
effects by building up offshore reserves, thereby sterilizing the impact in the local economy.
22 
Sterilizing resource rents in boom periods to maintain a competitive exchange rate and promote 
alternative exports is one of the main recommendations that emerges from the literature on why 
so few resource rich countries have performed better than resource scarce ones.
23 As long as 
Zambia continues with a policy whereby the real exchange rate is effectively made hostage to 
the vagaries of the copper market, there will be continuous under-achievement in the goal of 
economic diversification.
24 
Part of the problem at present is that, after the firm Anglo American withdrew, the 
operators who took over the copper mines were given extraordinarily generous terms. At this 
juncture, there are virtually no taxes payable and no mining royalties to the government. The 
main benefits to the economy are via employment and multiplier effects, both of which are 
                                            
22 ‘Coping with the Copper Boom’, The Economist, May 25, 2006. 
23 See, for example, Reinhardt (2000), Auty (2001, 2004) and Esanov et al. (2004). 
24 Kayizzi-Mugerwa (1991) uses a multisector general equilibrium model to show the complexity of the 
interlinkages in an economy subject to Dutch disease shocks because of the dominance of copper. He also argues 
for a more competitive exchange rate but observes that ‘in practical terms, the size of the devaluation of the nominal 
exchange rate necessary to realize a favorable change in the real exchange rate might be politically unacceptable. 
Success thus depends…on the political work put into selling the adjustment package’ (p. 862).  
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limited in the mining sector. Without abrogating agreements, it is important for the government 
to investigate ways of increasing its share in copper revenues.
25 Any additional resources which 
can be gleaned should be used to build up infrastructure, human capital and productive capacity 
in diverse sectors. The key sector which should be made to grow is agriculture, where there is so 
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Figure 1: Nominal rates of assistance to exportables, import-competing and all
a agricultural 
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Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. The total NRA can be above or below the exportable and import-competing averages because 
assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance is also included.  
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Figure 2: Nominal rates of assistance to all nonagricultural tradables, all agricultural tradable 
industries, and relative rates of assistance
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Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural and 
nonagricultural sectors, respectively.  
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Table 1: Nominal rates of assistance to covered farm products, Zambia, 1961 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Exportables
a, b  -23.4 -30.3 -46.4 -58.2 -47.7 -77.0 -57.7 -45.9 -52.6 
Groundnut  na -41.5 -59.4 -68.7 -66.4 -78.2 -77.2 -66.7 -69.2 
Cotton  na -31.6 -36.6 -38.9 -37.7 -76.6 -34.9 -27.5 -51.4 
Tobacco  (V)  -9.1 -18.4 -30.6 -57.2 -26.9 -77.1 -30.9  -5.2 -29.3 
Tobacco  (B)  -12.0 -47.7 -37.1 -50.1 -37.6 -80.0 -23.4 -23.9 -58.1 
           
Import-competing products
a, b  -9.4 -21.6 -41.8 -55.0 -23.0 -67.8 -53.7 -27.0 -10.1 
Rice  na -14.6 -52.9 -13.9  29.8 -50.5 -27.2  9.5 -23.8 
Wheat  na -76.7 -60.0 -28.2  12.4 -69.3 -60.2  11.8  23.2 
           
N o n t r a d a b l e s            
Millet  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
Sunflower  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
 
Mixed trade status
b           
Maize  -27.0 -33.7 -41.6 -57.1 -23.1 -67.6 -52.4 -28.3 -29.8 
Sorghum  na -15.4 -34.4 -64.1 -57.1 -73.7 -53.8 -50.9 -25.0 
Soybean  na -77.6 -71.3 -39.8 -33.4 -60.7 -54.7 -31.0 -15.7 
 
Total of covered products
a  -24.3 -32.8 -42.2 -57.3 -25.5 -68.2 -53.4 -33.6 -34.2 
Dispersion of covered products
c    21.8 32.6 26.8 36.2 35.1 33.8 39.4 35.7 33.2 
%  coverage  (at  undistorted  prices)  78 77 76 75 74 72 71 69 67 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. Weighted averages, with weights based on the unassisted value of production.  
b. Mixed trade status products included in exportable or import-competing groups depending upon their trade status in the particular year.  
c. Dispersion is a simple 5-year average of the annual standard deviation around the weighted mean of NRAs of covered products.   
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Table 2: Nominal rates of assistance to agricultural relative to nonagricultural industries, Zambia, 1961 to 2004 
(percent) 
    1961-64 1965-69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 
Covered  products  -24.3 -32.8 -42.2 -57.3 -25.5 -68.2 -53.4 -33.6 -34.2 
Non-covered products   -4.0  -15.2  -23.9 -34.7 -16.5 -51.6 -36.3 -26.5 -23.0 
All  agricultural  products  -19.7 -28.0 -36.8 -49.5 -22.6 -60.8 -46.5 -31.3 -31.3 
Non-product specific (NPS) assistance   na  5.8  22.4  13.7  20.9  2.7  18.1  2.7  2.8 
Total agricultural NRA (incl. NPS)
b  -19.7 -22.6 -15.8 -37.3  -2.7 -58.9 -30.8 -28.6 -28.5 
Trade bias index
b  -0.21  0.10 -0.06 -0.08 -0.30 -0.28 -0.08  0.00 -0.41 
           
Assistance to just tradables:           
   All agricultural tradables  -22.6  -33.1  -44.3  -57.9  -27.7  -70.0  -55.3  -36.7  -36.5 
   All non-agricultural tradables  16.1  20.0  27.6  34.5  24.1  24.2  21.2  13.5  6.4 
Relative rate of assistance, RRA
c  -33.4 -43.6 -56.2 -68.5 -41.5 -75.4 -62.7 -44.2 -40.3 
           
MEMO, ignoring exchange rate 
distortions:           
  NRA, all agric. products  -19.1 -18.3 -11.3 -17.9  -9.2 -63.1 -31.4 -25.3 -24.8 
  Trade bias index
b  -0.16  0.45 0.63 1.17 0.10 1.63 0.64 0.12  -0.41 
  RRA (relative rate of assistance)
c  -30.8 -36.3 -48.4 -49.0 -41.8 -74.2 -61.6 -38.9 -36.1 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. NRAs including product-specific input subsidies and non-product-specific (NPS) assistance. Total of assistance to primary factors and 
intermediate inputs divided to total value of primary agriculture production at undistorted prices (percent). 
b. Trade bias index is TBI = (1+NRAagx/100)/(1+NRAagm/100) – 1, where NRAagm and NRAagx are the average percentage NRAs for the 
import-competing and exportable parts of the agricultural sector. 




t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.  Appendix: Key quantity and price data, assumptions and sources  
 
 
For a landlocked country, it would generally be expected that fob import prices for crops 
imported from world markets would be significantly higher than cif export prices. The figures 
for Zambia indicate a small gap between import and export prices. For a crop such as maize, 
there are even years in which the import price is less than the export price. This is because much 
of the trade in agricultural commodities takes place within the region, rather than internationally, 
and because trade prices are averages for each calendar year. The main summer agricultural 
season runs from November to May/June of the following year, with wheat being grown under 
irrigation in the winter months (April/May to September). A calendar year thus covers part of 
two summer seasons, plus the winter crops. Imports and exports are undertaken according to 
circumstance and opportunity in each season, making the relationship between average annual 
import and export prices unpredictable. 
The import and export parity prices are converted to local currency terms at an 
equilibrium exchange rate that is estimated from the official rate and the proportion of export 
receipts traded on the parallel market (sanctioned secondary market, such as variants of export 
retention schemes) and/or the black market (illegal secondary market for foreign currency). The 
export proportion traded on the parallel market covers all exports: in the case of Zambia, 
institutional arrangements for the trade of agricultural commodities have been such that up to the 
early 1990s almost all import and export transactions involving the main crops have taken place 
at the official exchange rate. From an economic viewpoint, importation of food at the official 
rate was a very wasteful policy, with the government giving away all of the rent associated with 
the overvalued currency. The willingness of the government to do this is a reflection of the 
political importance assigned to keeping down the price of foodstuffs for the urban electorate. 
 
Crop coverage, data requirements and sources 
 
The crops covered in the study include exportable, import-competing and non-tradable products.  
The trading status of three crops (maize, sorghum and soybeans) is allowed to vary on a year-to-
year basis. Wheat and rice are import-competing products, millet and sunflowers are 
nontradables, and groundnuts, cotton and tobacco (Burley and Virginia) are exportables. In the 
case of rice, groundnuts and cotton, we estimate NRAs for the lightly processed products (milled 
rice, shelled groundnuts and cotton lint plus seed and its products, namely cotton seedcake and 
oil). The only crop that is analyzed both as in primary and lightly processed form is maize 
(maize grain and roller meal). 
The data requirements of the methodology as laid out in Anderson et al. (2008) far 
exceed the range, quality and consistency of data available for Zambia. The longest series of 
trade data is from FAOSTAT, but in several years data are missing or, alternatively, dividing 
value by price often produces aberrant unit values that clearly would not have applied in practice 
(e.g., when dividing two small numbers with few significant digits available). The gaps have 
been filled and the aberrant unit values ‘smoothed’ by using either national trade data (where 
available) or the international commodity reference price approach, noting also that much of 
Zambia’s agricultural trade is within the southern African region rather than to/from 
international ports. As a result, the reference prices for the Zambia case study are an amalgam of 
the two approaches outlined in the methodology.   
 
41
The only crops for which producer price data over the entire time period (1955-2004) are 
available are maize and tobacco, and then only from different sources which are not directly 
compatible with one another. For most of the commodities analyzed in detail in this study, basic 
producer price and production data are only available from 1966 to the mid-1990s. For the crops 
that have been traded through the Agricultural Commodity Exchange, which was established in 
1994, the price series extend up to the present but with estimates made from other data to fill 
gaps in 2001 and 2002.  
Given the five-decade time period for the study, the primary sources of data were 
affected by the political, administrative and policy changes which took place. Thus the initial 
data sources were publications of the Federal Statistics Office, with a separate Central Statistics 
Office (CSO) for Zambia only being established after independence in 1964. The regular 
publications at that time, such as the Monthly and Quarterly Digests of Statistics, gradually 
changed their emphasis and coverage, eventually ceasing to be published. A similar fate befell 
the invaluable annual Agricultural Statistics Bulletin. These changes reflect in part the changing 
orientation of donor agencies, with the flagship CSO publications in recent years having a 
poverty and livelihood orientation, a result of which is a relative neglect of basic macro-
economic and sectoral data. Complete series of the most relevant publications no longer exist in 
the libraries of the CSO or the Ministry of Agriculture. Where national data are not available, or 
are inconsistent, recourse has been made to FAOSTAT data which (for production and trade) are 
available from 1961. 
Prior to liberalization, the marketing boards were the main source of data. The key data 
relevant for the study were on marketed production and the minimum or floor prices paid to 
producers or the maximum or ceiling prices paid by purchasers. Total production data are 
estimated from the marketed tonnage figures, together with crop forecast surveys (CFS) and 
post-harvest surveys (PHS). 
Following liberalization of agriculture in the mid-1990s, the collection and publication of 
agricultural data changed dramatically. For production, the Ministry of Agriculture and Coops 
(MACO) collects and publishes CFS data for large-medium-and small-scale farmers. CSO 
collects PHS data on small (0-5 ha), medium-scale (5-20 ha) and large-scale farmers, but until 
recently has published data only for small and medium-scale farmers. Published data for the 
smaller crops – such as wheat, cotton and tobacco – have suffered from the fact that production 
of these crops, unlike maize is concentrated in few locations, and are not adequately covered by 
nation-wide studies. Hence the survey estimates tend to have wide confidence intervals. 
Wherever possible, this study has used industry estimates of production (e.g., tobacco data from 
the Tobacco Association of Zambia) which are generally considered more accurate than 
government figures.  
Similar problems bedevil the producer and consumer price data. Prices are time and 
location specific, and averaging to a single price for each product each calendar year is 
problematic. After liberalization, the Ministry of Agriculture established an Agricultural Market 
Information Centre (AMIC) which in principle collects price data from all the main provincial 
market centers on a monthly basis. Data exist but much of it has not been put in a data base and 
managed. Most of the data is on consumer prices; wholesale prices were collected only for a 
brief period (1994-98). AMIC also no longer goes to millers and stock feed companies to collect 
factory gate prices. Prices are also collected in the production surveys: the PHS gives prices for 
smallholder farmer sales, while CHS is more likely to report prices in sales by commercial 
traders and farmers.   
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Data has also been used from the Agricultural Commodities Exchange (ACE), which was 
established in 1994 to allow large farmers and brokers to trade in the main cereal crops. There 
are gaps in the data at a time of change of ownership (around 2002), but since 2003 CHC 
Commodities Ltd has published ACE prices on a weekly basis together with a report on market 
developments. It has also more recently begun to published futures prices from the South Africa 
Exchange SAFEX. These are ex-Randfontein prices, with estimates of transport and other costs 
being supplied so as to report landed import parity Lusaka prices (see example in Appendix 
Table 5). 
 
Transport and marketing margins 
 
Data on margins are not collected on a regular and systematic basis in Zambia. Not all of the 
margin data found during the course of this study has been directly used in making the NRA and 
CTE calculations. For example, bringing international commodity prices to cif or fob Lusaka 
equivalents was found to be particularly difficult in circumstances where agricultural trade was 
actually within the region, but regional price reference series were not available. Adding 
transport margins - which are multiples of the commodity price at the port in the international 
price series - often produces results which do not accord with recorded trade unit values for 
Zambia. As already mentioned, it was thus decided that wherever possible actual cif or fob 
prices would be used in the denominator of the NRA and CTE ratios, and where there were gaps 
or implausible values in the data series these would be filled by adding margins to the 
international reference prices which were close to margins in years immediately preceding or 
following the year in question. In practice, this implied very different margins and even different 
signs for various years in different time periods. 
As mentioned above, CHC Commodities Limited publishes weekly estimates of future 
import parity prices of various commodities based on SAFEX futures prices. An example, 
showing the detailed assumptions, is given in Appendix Table 5. In principle, after liberalization, 
the NRAs (excluding any non-policy price wedges) should gravitate towards the import duties (0 
percent on maize and 15 percent on soy, sunflower and wheat). In fact, other than for wheat the 
NRAs calculated in this study remain stubbornly negative more than a decade after 
liberalization. 
Various studies give sporadic information on internal transport costs. The Export 
Diversification Project (FAO 1992), for example, notes that intra year seasonal variations in 
transport costs are significant. In 1992, rates negotiated between the government and the 
Truckers Association of Zambia, plus Contract Haulage Limited (which together controlled 70 
percent of the road fleet) were Kw 11.6 per tonne-km for short distances (less than 50 km) to 
about Kw 7.8 per tonne-km for distances over 200 km. By December 1996, road transport over 
200 kms was reported to be Kw 117 per tonne-km (Coulter et al. 1996, Table 6). Rail transport 
rates in 1992 are reported in Appendix Table 6. 
Marketing margins have been intensively studied by the Food Security Research Project 
and related studies (Jayne et al. 1999, Mwanaumo 1997). The margin between the maize price 
and the retail price of maize meal during the pre-reform period was found to be between 30 
percent and 50 percent. This was significantly reduced after the reforms, not least because of the 
advent of hammer mills. 
 




Production volume data are primarily from CSO and MACO publications, in early years the 
CSO Quarterly Digest of Statistics and MACO’s annual Agricultural Statistics Bulletin. The 
main source of data was the marketing boards and the crop forecast and post-harvest surveys. In 
recent years, data has been collected by MACO’s Agricultural Market Information Centre and 
supplied mainly in electronic form. Where possible, production figures were cross-checked with 
FAOSTAT data. Quantity data for cotton and tobacco have also been obtained from industry 
sources (main cotton companies and the Tobacco Association of Zambia, respectively). 
Export and import volume data are from FAOSTAT, with some cross-checking and 
values for the most recent years being obtained from CSO data supplied electronically. 
Apparent consumption data are derived with some reference to the ‘marketed production’ 
data supplied by CSO and MACO for most of the crops studied. In the case of tobacco, an 
estimate of per capita consumption for burley and virginia tobaccos were combined with CSO 
population figures. 
 
Wholesale product prices 
 
The main sources again are CSO, MACO and AMIC publications and electronic data. Prior to 
1994, the prices are the minimum guaranteed prices, with actual prices received by farmers in 
principle being higher (in practice net realizations may have been lower where farmers had to 
meet transport costs). From 1994, some primary product prices have also been available from the 
Agricultural Commodity Exchange ACE. These are actual realized prices on the commodity 
exchange and are published on a weekly basis by CHC Commodities Ltd. Prices In other 
markets are generally lower. 
 
Border prices  
 
Where possible, fob and cif prices are calculated from the value of the country’s exports or 
imports divided by the volume of that trade, with those data extracted from FAOSTAT (1996) 
from 1961 to 2004. As noted in the text, some clearly aberrant values are ‘smoothed’ using 
national trade data (supplied electronically by CSO) or international trade commodity price data 
(extracted from the World Bank’s Global Economic Monitor Database). No quality difference 




Official exchange rates are from the IMF (2006 and earlier years) 
Parallel exchange rates are assumed to be the black market rates, as reported in 
International Currency Analysis (1993 and earlier years) and reproduced as premia in Easterly 
(2006). The proportion of export revenues realized on the parallel market is assumed to be 10 
percent in most years but 5 percent from 1955-1970, 25 percent in 1984 and 1992 and 50 percent 
from 1985 to 1991. From the mid-1980s to 1993, multiple exchange rates operated, the main 
impact being that food imports were generally at the official rate (keeping the domestic currency 
cost of food down) while agricultural exports were at a blend rate. At the margin, however, even 




Conversion factors and other parameters 
 
The background paper for the KSV study (Jansen 1988) was an invaluable source of information, 




Categories where insufficient data were found to construct time series of any significant duration 
for Zambia were: farm-gate product prices, transport, handling and processing margins, 
intermediate input prices and input-output value coefficients, production, consumption, input and 
trade taxes. Subsidy data were compiled from disparate sources, including Jansen (1988) and 
various World Bank publications on Zambia. The NRAs for non-agricultural tradable goods 
assumes there are no distortions for exportables and that the only ones for import-competing 
non-farm goods producers are tariffs, taken from COMTRADE (2006). 
 
Principal data sources 
 
Bank of Zambia, Quarterly Financial & Statistical Review, Lusaka, various editions 
Central Statistics Office, Government of Zambia, Quarterly Digest of Statistics, Lusaka, various 
editions. 
COMTRADE (2006), The United Nation Statistical Division Commodity Trade Data Base, data 
compiled through the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS). World Bank, and the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Available at 
wits.worldbank.org, accessed September. 
Easterly, W. (2006), Global Development Network Growth Database, accessed 23 June 
http://www.nyu.edu/fas/institute/dri/global%20development%20network%20growth%20
database.htm 
FAO (2006), Zambia Country Profile, Rome: Food and Agriculture Organization. 
FAOSTAT (2006), Food and Agriculture Organization Statistics Databases. Available at: 
//faostat.fao.org. Accessed various dates during May and July 2006. 
IMF (2005 and earlier years) Zambia - Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix, Washington 
DC: International Monetary Fund. 
IMF (2005 and earlier years), Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions: Annual 
Report, Washington DC: International Monetary Fund (available back to 1950). 
IMF (2006 and earlier years), International Financial Statistics, Washington DC: International 
Monetary Fund (annual). 
International Currency Analysis (1993 and earlier years), World Currency Yearbook (formerly 
Pick’s Currency Yearbook), Brooklyn NY: International Currency Analysis, Inc. 
Jansen, D. (1988), Trade, Exchange Rate, and Agricultural Pricing Policies in Zambia, World 
Bank Comparative Studies, The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing Policy, 
Washington DC. 
Ministry of Agriculture, Government of Zambia (published annually up to end of 1990s), 
Agricultural Statistics Bulletin, Lusaka, various editions. 
Ministry of Finance & Economic Development, Government of Zambia, Macroeconomic 
Indicators, various editions.  
World Bank (2006a), Global Economic Monitor Database, Washington DC, World Bank  
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ACE    Agricultural Commodities Exchange 
AMIC   Agricultural Market Information Centre (part of MACO) 
CSO    Central Statistics Office (established at independence in 1964) 
FAOSTAT  Food and Agricultural Organization Statistical Database 
MACO    Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives (in early years just Ministry of  
Agriculture, Food and Fisheries)  
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Appendix Figure 2: Agricultural GDP, Zambia, 1970 to 2004 
 
 










1970  1972  1974  1976  1978  1980  1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000  2002  2004 
1995 $ 
5 yr averages 
 
48
Appendix Figure 3: Maize production, Zambia, 1970 to 2005 
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Appendix Figure 5: Product shares of food consumption expenditure, Zambia, 1961 to 2005 
(percent) 
 











































Appendix Figure 7: Exchange rate parallel market premium, Zambia, 1965 to 2005 
(proportion by which parallel rate exceeds official rate) 
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Appendix Table 1: Prices for primary products, Zambia, 1955 to 2005 
 
(a) Maize, sorghum and wheat 



























      
DP-
BP     
BP 
1955 40  45  -0.11            
1956 42  36  0.19            
1957 41  29  0.41            
1958 42  38  0.11            
1959 39  38  0.03            
1960 40  39  0.01            
1961 40  51  -0.22            
1962 35  51  -0.32            
1963 31  56  -0.44            
1964 41  45  -0.09            
1965 41  42  -0.02            
1966 37  46  -0.20 39 44 -0.12 57  210 -0.73
1967 34  47  -0.27 52 46 0.13 56  232 -0.76
1968 32  55  -0.42 52 74 -0.30 59  250 -0.76
1969 36  156  -0.77 52 77 -0.32 59  321 -0.82
1970 39  51  -0.24 52 67 -0.22 61  165 -0.63
1971 44  99  -0.55 52 66 -0.21 68  239 -0.71
1972 48  83  -0.42 52 93 -0.44 68  211 -0.68
1973 48  80  -0.40 52 104 -0.50 83  179 -0.54
1974 48  89  -0.46 56 86 -0.36 133  238 -0.44
1975 56  153  -0.64 67 127 -0.48 178  269 -0.34
1976 70  104  -0.32 67 173 -0.62 178  253 -0.30
1977 70  288  -0.76 67 245 -0.73 178  354 -0.50
1978 76  233  -0.68 67 241 -0.72 222  301 -0.26
1979 100  187  -0.47 67 196 -0.66 222  225 -0.01
1980 130  263  -0.51 67 234 -0.72 222  236 -0.06
1981 150  166  -0.10 100 223 -0.55 289  236 0.22
1982 178  185  -0.04 100 210 -0.52 356  256 0.39
1983 203  230  -0.12 178 310 -0.43 397  308 0.29
1984 272  452  -0.40 207 576 -0.64 472  608 -0.22
1985 315  676  -0.53 299 822 -0.64 502  1,248 -0.60
1986 611  1,273  -0.52 475 1,183 -0.60 960  1,655 -0.42
1987 867  4,202  -0.79 822 4,106 -0.80 1,233  9,441 -0.87
1988 889  5,845  -0.85 844 7,478 -0.89 2,111  16,243 -0.87
1989 1,200  3,803  -0.68 1,148 4,842 -0.76 2,509  8,622 -0.71
1990 3,158  13,829  -0.77 3,000 17,140 -0.82 5,411  30,702 -0.82
1991 5,556  16,134  -0.66 5,278 18,418 -0.71 7,600  48,155 -0.84
1992 13,333  28,256  -0.53 11,269 29,614 -0.62 14,419  54,415 -0.74
1993 55,556  69,134  -0.20 55,556 84,022 -0.34 28,889  132,513 -0.78
1994 89,444  168,274  -0.47 105,556 130,711 -0.19 168,222  143,525 0.17
1995 165,926  198,989 -0.17 166,667 180,687 -0.08 227,654  228,073 0.00
1996 197,118  412,836 -0.52 177,778 451,395 -0.61 422,222  264,572 0.60 
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1997 204,167  298,002 -0.31 162,963 354,990 -0.54 369,192  397,413 -0.07
1998 360,185  530,802 -0.32 166,667 627,586 -0.73 424,074  383,411 0.11
1999 636,944  699,171 -0.09 250,000 604,569 -0.59 514,794  536,087 -0.04
2000 351,111  740,823 -0.53 298,876 821,294 -0.64 699,857  637,802 0.10
2001 396,144  627,895 -0.37 375,647 1,136,776 -0.67      
2002 885,188  971,185 -0.09 558,036 636,493 -0.12      
2003 765,440  796,417 -0.04 580,580 550,627 0.05 1,354,085  1,129,909 0.20
2004 700,779  1,317,055 -0.47 769,011 685,134 0.12 1,519,340  904,233 0.68
2005 952,558  881,669 0.08 1,387,262 1,723,263 -0.19 1,475,334  1,347,891 0.09
 
 
(b) Millet, sunflower and soyabean 


























1966 39    0            
1967 35    0 49   0 41 157 -0.74
1968 56    0 49   0 36 173 -0.79
1969 52    0 49   0 36 174 -0.80
1970 52    0 49   0 36 179 -0.80
1971 52    0 168   0 93 235 -0.60
1972 52    0 120   0 93 299 -0.69
1973 56    0 133   0 93 518 -0.82
1974 67    0 179   0 147 424 -0.65
1975 67    0 168   0 147 458 -0.68
1976 67    0 200   0 189 169 0.12
1977 67    0 200   0 189 681 -0.72
1978 67    0 270   0 239 703 -0.66
1979 67    0 274   0 278 291 -0.04
1980 67    0 328   0 356 590 -0.40
1981 67    0 352   0 403 556 -0.28
1982 67    0 415   0 469 519 -0.10
1983 322    0 430   0 503  743 -0.32
1984 328    0 430   0 583  1,379 -0.58
1985 423    0 558   0 677  1,237 -0.45
1986 625    0 839   0 1,246  1,239 0.01
1987 1,022    0 1,400   0 1,644 19,719 -0.92
1988 1,778    0 1,800   0 2,417 23,259 -0.90
1989 2,199    0 3,240   0 3,111 13,779 -0.77
1990 4,833    0 6,428   0 6,413 44,613 -0.86
1991 7,778    0 10,072   0 8,905 25,693 -0.65
1992 16,925    0 18,823   0 25,794  47,192 -0.45
1993 175,556    0 80,000   0 88,889  282,916 -0.69
1994 177,778    0 137,000   0 222,222  243,276 -0.09
1995 180,000    0 210,000   0 280,556  458,242 -0.39
1996 200,000    0 240,000   0 331,204  434,027 -0.24
1997 222,204    0 227,500   0 380,556  457,453 -0.17
1998 276,389    0 341,111   0 403,611  547,779 -0.26
1999 337,037    0 440,000   0 413,148  814,636 -0.49 
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2000 376,579    0 512,000   0 683,436  556,708 0.23
2001 396,970    0 549,964   0 500,000  891,861 -0.44
2002 586,364    0 641,952   0 638,889  899,806 -0.29
2003 586,296    0 803,611   0 1,466,188  1,144,935 0.28
2004             1,687,729  3,864,351 -0.56
2005       962,769   0 1,278,829  1,229,937 0.04
 
(c) Tobacco  

















1955 489 516  -0.05 625 630  -0.01
1956 408 465  -0.12 570 567  0.01
1957 680 567  0.20 700 692  0.01
1958 414 544  -0.24 643 665  -0.03
1959 403 563  -0.28 611 687  -0.11
1960 606 556  0.09 617 679  -0.09
1961 441 672  -0.34 608 677  -0.10
1962 589 600  -0.02 644 750  -0.14
1963 505 656  -0.23 758 820  -0.07
1964 392 433  -0.09 514 539  -0.05
1965 320 472  -0.32 602 586  0.03
1966 313 573  -0.45 650 721  -0.10
1967 276 791  -0.65 940 1,004  -0.06
1968 441 856  -0.48 650 1,086  -0.40
1969 507 959  -0.47 750 1,218  -0.38
1970 560 732  -0.24 810 926  -0.13
1971 560 853  -0.34 810 1,077  -0.25
1972 570 949  -0.40 880 1,198  -0.27
1973 620  1,252  -0.50 880 1,579  -0.44
1974 860  1,373  -0.37 960 1,732  -0.45
1975 970  1,435  -0.32 840 1,809  -0.54
1976 1,010 1,751 -0.42 970 2,218 -0.56
1977 1,060 3,040 -0.65 1,100 3,862 -0.72
1978 1,100 3,474 -0.68 1,450 4,394 -0.67
1979 1,110 1,919 -0.42 1,510 2,421 -0.38
1980 1,250 1,272 -0.02 1,570 1,592 -0.01
1981 1,260 2,510 -0.50 1,650 3,083 -0.46
1982 1,560 2,577 -0.39 2,400 3,111 -0.23
1983 1,650 2,519 -0.34 2,700 3,050 -0.11
1984 1,800 4,784 -0.62 2,800 5,873 -0.52
1985 2,300 7,081 -0.68 3,450 8,676 -0.60
1986 3,500  23,264 -0.85 5,120 28,660 -0.82
1987 5,100  45,511 -0.89 6,250 56,217 -0.89
1988 9,000  59,484 -0.85 14,000 72,216 -0.81
1989 12,000 45,624  -0.74 14,400 54,698  -0.74
1990 48,000  190,115  -0.75 60,000 224,979  -0.73
1991 86,000  118,848  -0.28 87,450 135,623  -0.36
1992 145,000 548,390  -0.74 166,320 617,251  -0.73 
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1993 867,100 576,546  0.50 747,040 666,696  0.12
1994 857,660 790,348  0.09 1,089,650 945,312  0.15
1995 1,321,170 1,565,429  -0.16 1,789,670 1,869,930  -0.04
1996 2,284,480 1,948,940  0.17 3,556,520 2,235,678  0.59
1997 1,932,560 2,839,198  -0.32 3,069,360 3,220,093  -0.05
1998 2,102,100 4,610,420  -0.54 2,809,170 5,181,111  -0.46
1999 3,156,000 4,842,829  -0.35 3,813,500 5,460,128  -0.30
2000 2,341,560 4,333,125  -0.46 4,600,960 5,007,876  -0.08
2001 2,344,550 4,627,204  -0.49 4,328,400 5,375,601  -0.19
2002 3,222,600 8,805,226  -0.63 6,523,800 9,984,418  -0.35
2003 4,614,390  16,153,770  -0.71 8,016,920 18,024,663  -0.56
2004 4,419,000  11,188,493  -0.61 8,935,000 12,494,657  -0.28
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table 2: Prices for lightly processed foods, Zambia, 1961 to 2005 
(a) Maize meal and milled rice 




















1961 62  146  -0.58      
1962 54  146  -0.63      
1963 49  159  -0.70      
1964 64  175  -0.64      
1965 64  249  -0.74      
1966 58  205  -0.72 164 163 0.01 
1967 54  207  -0.74 190 222 -0.15 
1968 50  133  -0.62 190 250 -0.24 
1969 55  196  -0.72 190 238 -0.20 
1970 61  236  -0.74 190 451 -0.58 
1971 69  176  -0.61 190 521 -0.64 
1972 75  299  -0.75 232 571 -0.59 
1973 75  236  -0.68 232 505 -0.54 
1974 75  241  -0.69 316 449 -0.30 
1975 87  378  -0.77 316 355 -0.11 
1976 109 478  -0.77 379 500 -0.24 
1977 109 632  -0.83 379 484 -0.22 
1978 118 577  -0.80 379 473 -0.20 
1979 156 501  -0.69 421 394 0.07 
1980 203 546  -0.63 474 425 0.12 
1981 234 552  -0.58 474 460 0.03 
1982 277 507  -0.45 738 482 0.53 
1983 317 784  -0.60 1,054 718 0.47 
1984 425  1,577  -0.73 1,054 782 0.35 
1985 491  2,144  -0.77 1,054 1,129 -0.07 
1986 954  3,412  -0.72 1,464 2,176 -0.33 
1987 1,352  11,530 -0.88 2,186 9,806 -0.78 
1988 1,387  18,720 -0.93 2,924 15,138 -0.81 
1989 1,873  11,274 -0.83 4,441 9,829 -0.55 
1990 4,928  40,674 -0.88 9,732 32,106 -0.70 
1991 8,669  18,066 -0.52 15,422 41,116 -0.62 
1992 20,806 30,046  -0.31 34,293 98,758 -0.65 
1993 94,875 82,988  0.14 210,714 127,014 0.66 
1994 159,673 131,050  0.22 289,732 302,460 -0.04 
1995 255,166 215,804  0.18 948,214 550,712 0.72 
1996 341,590 500,407  -0.32 1,106,250 805,543 0.37 
1997 333,283 372,697  -0.11 532,639 696,203 -0.23 
1998 552,861 416,950  0.33 653,214 750,606 -0.13 
1999 582,159 543,528  0.07 659,458 886,289 -0.26 
2000 549,154 734,990  -0.25 555,874 1,078,677 -0.48 
2001 714,969  1,147,463  -0.38 961,937 1,180,854 -0.19 
2002 1,225,286 1,060,044  0.16 927,671 1,348,020 -0.31 
2003 1,140,939  958,637  0.19 1,227,042 1,192,970 0.03 
2004 916,667  3,321,087  -0.72       
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2005 1,140,741 2,732,863  -0.58      
 
(b) Shelled groundnuts and cotton lint 



















1965 120 244  -0.51 329 451 -0.27 
1966 128 216  -0.41 329 537 -0.39 
1967 124 159  -0.22 352 443 -0.20 
1968 128 205  -0.38 352 572 -0.38 
1969 128 286  -0.55 352 527 -0.33 
1970 128 221  -0.42 399 496 -0.20 
1971 128 287  -0.56 399 487 -0.18 
1972 128 390  -0.67 399 728 -0.45 
1973 158 437  -0.64 399 1,058 -0.62 
1974 213 665  -0.68 587 947 -0.38 
1975 213 879  -0.76 704 1,057 -0.33 
1976 313 701  -0.55 939 1,715 -0.45 
1977 313  1,320  -0.76 939 2,062 -0.54 
1978 358  1,364  -0.74 1,080 1,801 -0.40 
1979 400  1,054  -0.62 1,080 1,369 -0.21 
1980 438  2,119  -0.79 1,080 1,793 -0.40 
1981 576  1,299  -0.56 1,080 1,209 -0.11 
1982 600  1,433  -0.58 1,103 1,663 -0.34 
1983 688  2,071  -0.67 1,221 2,162 -0.44 
1984 894  3,175  -0.72 1,361 3,475 -0.61 
1985 1,146 3,702  -0.69 1,573 4,064 -0.61 
1986 1,644 5,289  -0.69 1,972 6,006 -0.67 
1987 2,025  23,433  -0.91 3,756 39,721 -0.91 
1988 3,625  19,012  -0.81 7,042 55,231 -0.87 
1989 4,210  21,590  -0.81 8,450 35,937 -0.76 
1990 8,530  108,443  -0.92 22,768 98,473 -0.77 
1991 13,836  130,375  -0.89 36,452 119,619 -0.70 
1992 35,025  137,237  -0.74 201,861 179,015 0.13 
1993 125,000 508,054  -0.75 281,667 652,937 -0.57 
1994 342,500 753,537  -0.55 938,889 808,082 0.16 
1995 375,000 982,682  -0.62 1,135,837 1,153,450 -0.02 
1996 387,500  1,563,773  -0.75 1,332,549 1,407,396 -0.05 
1997 562,963  1,491,376  -0.62 1,295,875 1,594,206 -0.19 
1998 496,296  4,144,116  -0.88 1,267,500 2,264,180 -0.44 
1999 883,133  2,726,146  -0.68 1,008,938 3,138,793 -0.68 
2000 642,111  2,974,104  -0.78 1,533,387 3,237,261 -0.53 
2001 754,728  3,674,285  -0.79 1,971,667 4,044,801 -0.51 
2002 914,727  3,168,849  -0.71 2,018,611 5,597,281 -0.64 
2003 1,299,104 2,489,537 -0.48 2,863,611 4,601,282 -0.38 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet  
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Appendix Table 3: Foreign exchange rates, Zambia, 1955 to 2005 


























1955 0.71    0.71 0.00   0.71 
1956 0.71    0.71 0.00   0.71 
1957 0.71    0.71 0.00   0.71 
1958 0.71    0.71 0.00   0.71 
1959 0.71    0.71 0.00   0.71 
1960 0.71    0.74 0.05   0.73 
1961 0.71    0.74 0.05   0.73 
1962 0.71    0.74 0.05   0.73 
1963 0.71    0.87 0.05   0.80 
1964 0.71    0.78 0.05   0.75 
1965 0.71    0.78 0.05   0.75 
1966 0.71    0.75 0.05   0.74 
1967 0.71    0.82 0.05   0.77 
1968 0.71    1.05 0.05   0.89 
1969 0.71    1.11 0.05   0.92 
1970 0.71    0.94 0.05   0.83 
1971 0.71    1.27 0.10   1.02 
1972 0.71    1.54 0.10   1.17 
1973 0.65    1.24 0.10   0.98 
1974 0.64    0.99 0.10   0.84 
1975 0.64    1.54 0.10   1.14 
1976 0.70    1.73 0.10   1.27 
1977 0.79    2.37 0.10   1.66 
1978 0.80    1.95 0.10   1.43 
1979 0.79    1.32 0.10   1.08 
1980 0.79    1.33 0.10   1.09 
1981 0.87    1.21 0.10   1.05 
1982 0.93    1.35 0.10   1.16 
1983 1.26    1.59 0.10   1.44 
1984 1.81    3.55 0.25   2.90 
1985 3.14    5.32 0.50   4.78 
1986 7.79    10.39 0.50   9.74 
1987 9.52    47.60 0.50   38.08 
1988 8.27    57.86 0.50   45.46 
1989 13.81    31.90 0.50   27.38 
1990 30.29    121.61 0.50   98.78 
1991 64.64    134.23 0.50   116.83 
1992 172.21    204.10 0.25   192.14 
1993 452.76    553.29 0.10   508.05 
1994 669.37    822.40 0.10   753.54  
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1995 864.12    935.60 0.10   903.43 
1996 1,208    1,286.30 0.10   1,251.02 
1997 1,315    1,564.92 0.10   1,452.23 
1998 1,8628    2,327.59 0.10   2,118.10 
1999 2,388    2,388.02 0.10   2,388.02 
2000 3,111    3,110.84 0.10   3,110.84 
2001 3,611    3,610.94 0.10   3,610.94 
2002 4,399    4,398.60 0.10   4,398.60 
2003 4,733    4,733.27 0.10   4,733.27 
2004 4,797    4,797.13 0.10   4,797.13 
2005 4,616    4,616.07 0.10   4,616.07 
 
a  The proportion of foreign currency actually sold by all exporters at the parallel market rate. 
b  See Anderson et al. (2008) on the exchange rate methodology used in this study. 
 
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet Appendix Table 4: Chronology of policy milestones, Zambia 
 Political  Macro-economic  Trade Policy  Agricultural Policy  Food policy 
1955  Federal Government 
based in Southern 
Rhodesia 
           
1963  End of Federation             
1964  Independence (24 Oct), 
start of First Republic 
           
1965  Rhod sanctions- 
Zambia's road & rail 
links affected 
        
1969  Nationalisation of 
copper mines 
        
1971         From  1971-88, 
substantial maize meal 
subsidies 
1973  Second Republic (Aug) 
- one party state 
        
1974        Copper prices start to 
fall from mid-1974 
     
1977  Dissidents in UNIP 
oppose economic 
management 
Presidential speech on economic 
crisis (Oct) 
      
1978    Austerity budget        
1980  Failed coup attempt 
(Oct) 
        
1981  Detention of labour 
leaders - strikes 
Real interest rates negative 
1981-1993 (peak of -137% in 
1992) 
        
1984   Economic  restructuring 
announced (Aug) 
      
1985    Forex auction and import 
liberalisation 
      
1986  Economic team changed 
(April) 
    Liberalisation of inter-district grain 
trade 
Maize meal riots on 
Copperbelt (Dec); 




 Political  Macro-economic  Trade Policy  Agricultural Policy  Food policy 
1987  Labour unrest (Jan); 
Mayday speech 
announcing break with 
BWI 
BWI programmes suspended; 
New Economic Recovery 
Programme (May) 
      
1989  WB/IMF agreement on 
PFP 
Devaluation and 
removal of price 
controls 
  NAMBOARD abolished, maize 
marketing function transferred to 
Cooperative Federation 
Tripling of maize 
price, coupon system 
for targeting subsidy 
(operational until 
1992); other consumer 
prices decontrolled 
1990  Maize meal riots & 
coup attempt (June); 
formation of MMD 
(Aug) 
Dual exchange rate 
system 
    Maize meal subsidy 
removed; food riots 




Removal of most export 
controls & ban on maize 
exports 
Substantial reduction in fertiliser 
subsidy (Dec) 
Subsidy re-introduced 
before the election 
1992  Chiluba govt. 
Privatisation Law 
(July); key ministers 
resign (Aug); first phase 
of PS redundancy (Sept) 
Devaluation (30%) 






exchange rates unified 
(Dec) 
Non trade exporters allowed 
100% retention & import 
preferences except for PTA 
revoked (Jan); OGIL 
expanded (Oct); increased 
COMESA preference 
Major drought - substantial maize 
imports needed.  Fertiliser market 
opened to full competition & pan-
territorial pricing eliminated - pricing to 
reflect differential transport costs 
(June). 





1993  Zero Option Plan to 
overthrow Chiluba 
discovered (Feb); state 
of emergency for a 
period; reform ministers 
sacked (April) 
Cash budget, tax 
reduction & weekly 
tender (Jan) 
General reduction in tariffs 
and excises & shift to HS 
(Jan); elimination of import & 
export licences (June) 
Markets for maize & fertiliser opened 
to full competition (July) 
Official producer and 
selling prices 
abolished. 
1994  Chiluba speech 
criticising economic and 
agric policies (July) 
Exchange controls 
removed (Jan) 
In-bond & duty drawback 
schemes (Jan) 
Agricultural Credit Management 
Programme 
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 Political  Macro-economic  Trade Policy  Agricultural Policy  Food policy 
1995  Bank crisis; Land Act 
(July) 
VAT (July)  Removal of 20% uplift factor 
applied to import values 
Privatisation of the milling industry.  
Launch of World Bank Agricultural 
Sector Investment Programme 
No floor price for 
maize. Hammermills 
help reduce the price 
of food 
1996  MMD win elections boycotted 
by UNIP 
  Customs duty exemptions eliminated, 






1997  Failed coup (Oct); Kaunda 
detained & soe declared 
Donors withdraw balance of 
payments support 
      
1998  Finance Minister fired          
2000  ZCCM sale to Anglo American          
2001  Election November          
2002  Mwanawasa govt Anglo American 
withdrawal 
Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Paper presented to donors 
  GM food aid refused; FRA 
as subsidised buyer from 
small-scale sector 
  
2003        Maize & fertliser subsidies 
increased 
  
2005     HIPC Completion Point 
attained (April) 
        
 
 
Sources: Based on Jansen (1991), Rakner et al. (1999) and McCulloch et al. (2001), with cross-checking and additions from many 





Source: CHC Commodities, Lusaka 
U.S.$1.00 = ZK3,420.00 @ 23/12/05 
.                                                                                                                                                                            . 
SAFEX Futures Prices for October in U.S.$ (ex Randfontein, RSA) as at 23/12/05 
 
   UNIT   BIDS     OFFERS       MTM  IMPORT  PARITY 
(EST) 
         DDP OR DDU, 
LUSAKA,  
Soya bean    US$/MT   $252.23     $263.26         $255.38    $469.66 
(DDP)   
 
Sunflower    US$/MT   $342.08     $349.96         $349.96    $581.17 
(DDP)   
 
Wheat       US$/MT   $220.70     $221.17          $220.70    $428.77 
(DDP) 
 
White Maize    US$/MT   $178.92     $180.50          $179.71    $335.83 
(DDU) 
 
Yellow Maize    US$/MT   $143.30     $145.03          $143.45    $298.66 
(DDU) 
Exchange rate from Xe.com U.S.$1.00 : SAR6.34  @  23/12/05 
Import parity Prices Include: 
Duty @ 15% on Soya, Sunflower & Wheat & 0% duty on White & Yellow Maize.  
Bagging & Handling ex silo @ U.S.$13.00 per metric tonne 
Wheat price excludes VAT @ 17.5% 
Insurance @ 1% 
Clearing costs @ 1.5% 
Freight rate estimated @ U.S.$130.00/mt Randfontein to Lusaka 
DDP: Incoterm”Delivered Duty Paid” 
DDU: Incoterm “Delivered Duty Unpaid” 
                                                                                                                                                                         .
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Appendix Table 6: Rail Transport Rates, Zambia, 1992 
 
 









Cotton Lusaka Livingstone  Kw  2340 
Tobacco* Lusaka  Livingstone  Kw  2240 
Maize  Lusaka  Victoria Falls  US$ 53 
Cotton  Lusaka  Victoria Falls  US$ 54 
Tobacco*  Lusaka  Victoria Falls  US$ 54 
Maize  Lusaka  New Kapiri  US$ 22 
Cotton  Lusaka  New Kapiri  US$ 33.80 
Tobacco* 
 





Appendix Table 7: Annual distortion estimates, Zambia, 1961 to 2004 
(a) Nominal rates of assistance to covered products 
(percent) 
   CottonGroundnut Maize Millet Rice Sorghum Soybean SunflowerTobacco VTobacco B Wheat
All
covered
1961 na na -22 na na na na na -10 -34 na -21
1962 na na -32 na na na na na -14 -2 na -29
1963 na na -44 na na na na na -7 -23 na -38
1964 na na -9 na na na na na -5 -9 na -9
1965 -27 -51 -2 na na na na na 3 -32 na -11
1966 -39 -41 -20 0 na -12 na na -10 -45 -73 -22
1967 -20 -22 -27 0 na 13 na 0 -6 -65 -76 -22
1968 -38 -38 -42 0 -24 -30 na 0 -40 -48 -76 -38
1969 -33 -55 -77 0 -20 -32 na 0 -38 -47 -82 -69
1970 -20 -42 -24 0 -58 -22 na 0 -13 -24 -63 -25
1971 -18 -56 -55 0 -64 -21 na 0 -25 -34 -71 -50
1972 -45 -67 -42 0 -59 -44 na 0 -27 -40 -68 -43
1973 -62 -64 -40 0 -54 -50 -82 0 -44 -50 -54 -45
1974 -38 -68 -46 0 -30 -36 -65 0 -45 -37 -44 -47
1975 -33 -76 -64 0 -11 -48 -68 0 -54 -32 -34 -63
1976 -45 -55 -32 0 -24 -62 12 0 -56 -42 -30 -39
1977 -54 -76 -76 0 -22 -73 -72 0 -72 -65 -50 -74
1978 -40 -74 -68 0 -20 -72 -66 0 -67 -68 -26 -66
1979 -21 -62 -47 0 7 -66 -4 0 -38 -42 -1 -45
1980 -40 -79 -51 0 12 -72 -40 0 -1 -2 -6 -49
1981 -11 -56 -10 0 3 -55 -28 0 -46 -50 22 -13
1982 -34 -58 -4 0 53 -52 -10 0 -23 -39 39 -8
1983 -44 -67 -12 0 47 -43 -32 0 -11 -34 29 -15
1984 -61 -72 -40 0 35 -64 -58 0 -52 -62 -22 -42
1985 -61 -69 -53 0 -7 -64 -45 0 -60 -68 -60 -52
1986 -67 -69 -52 0 -33 -60 1 0 -82 -85 -42 -54
1987 -91 -91 -79 0 -78 -80 -92 0 -89 -89 -87 -82
1988 -87 -81 -85 0 -81 -89 -90 0 -81 -85 -87 -85
1989 -76 -81 -68 0 -55 -76 -77 0 -74 -74 -71 -69
1990 -77 -92 -77 0 -70 -82 -86 0 -73 -75 -82 -79
1991 -70 -89 -66 0 -62 -71 -65 0 -36 -28 -84 -69
1992 13 -74 -53 0 -65 -62 -45 0 -73 -74 -74 -51
1993 -57 -75 -20 0 66 -34 -69 0 12 50 -78 -31
1994 16 -55 -47 0 -4 -19 -9 0 15 9 17 -37
1995 -2 -40 -17 0 72 -8 -39 0 -4 -16 0 -15
1996 -5 -75 -52 0 37 -61 -24 0 59 17 60 -46
1997 -19 -62 -31 0 -23 -54 -17 0 -5 -32 -7 -31
1998 -44 -88 -32 0 -13 -73 -26 0 -46 -54 11 -47
1999 -68 -68 -9 0 -26 -59 -49 0 -30 -35 -4 -29
2000 -53 -78 -53 0 -48 -64 23 0 -8 -46 10 -50
2001 -51 -79 -37 0 -19 -67 -44 0 -19 -49 12 -41
2002 -64 -71 -9 0 -31 -12 -29 0 -35 -63 7 -27
2003 -38 -48 -4 0 3 5 28 0 -56 -71 20 -19




Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Zambia, 1961 to 2004  
(b) Nominal and relative rates of assistance to all
a agricultural products, to exportable
b and 
import-competing
 b agricultural industries, and relative
c to non-agricultural industries (percent) 
Total ag NRA  Ag tradables NRA 
Covered products 














1961 0  -21  -3  na  -21  0 -20  15 -30 
1962 0  -29  -4  na  -29  0 -27  15 -36 
1963 0  -38  -6  na  -38  0 -35  19 -46 
1964 0  -9  -4  na  -5  -9  -9  16 -22 
1965 0  -11  -2  -7  -11  0 -12  16 -25 
1966 0  -22  -7  -17  -24  -13 -22  15 -33 
1967 0  -22  0  -9  -25  11 -21  18 -32 
1968 0  -38  -17  -26  -41  -30 -39  25 -51 
1969 0  -69  -51  -54  -49  -76 -71  26 -77 
1970 0  -25  -13  17  -33  -24 -27  22 -40 
1971 0  -50  -30  -29  -44  -54 -52  28 -63 
1972 0  -43  -26  -20  -58  -42 -47  33 -60 
1973 0  -45  -28  -25  -48  -51 -48  30 -60 
1974 0  -47  -22  -22  -50  -38 -48  25 -58 
1975 0  -63  -30  -39  -65  -46 -62  35 -72 
1976 0  -39  -29  -25  -39  -53 -42  36 -57 
1977 0  -74  -48  -59  -75  -67 -73  39 -81 
1978 0  -66  -42  -47  -67  -63 -66  35 -75 
1979 0  -45  -25  -17  -44  -46 -46  27 -57 
1980 0  -49  -29  -18  -53  -50 -51  27 -61 
1981 0  -13  -9  13  -39  -11 -15  22 -31 
1982 0  -8  -7  18  -40  -4 -10  24 -27 
1983 0  -15  -11  4  -46  -11 -18  20 -31 
1984 0  -42  -26  -31  -61  -39 -45  27 -57 
1985 0  -52  -33  -44  -61  -53 -55  21 -63 
1986 0  -54  -36  -47  -70  -52 -56  18 -62 
1987 0  -82  -69  -73  -91  -80 -83  29 -87 
1988 0  -85  -70  -74  -85  -85 -85  30 -89 
1989 0  -69  -50  -56  -78  -69 -71  24 -76 
1990 0  -79  -62  -66  -85  -78 -80  28 -84 
1991 0  -69  -48  -50  -74  -68 -70  23 -76 
1992 0  -51  -32  -2  -46  -57 -54  18 -61 
1993 0  -31  -19  -14  -59  -24 -34  19 -44 
1994 0  -37  -20  -22  -25  -42 -39  19 -49 
1995 0  -15  -10  -6  -22  -15 -17  17 -29 
1996 0  -46  -27  -37  -36  -49 -46  17 -54 
1997 0  -31  -20  -27  -37  -30 -32  12 -40 
1998 0  -47  -44  -45  -73  -31 -54  13 -59 
1999 0  -29  -31  -29  -63  -10 -34  8 -39 
2000 0  -50  -25  -41  -54  -15 -48  8 -52 
2001 0  -41  -22  -31  -47  -18 -41  8 -45 
2002 0  -27  -30  -25  -62  -8 -32  8 -37 
2003 0  -19  -19  -17  -48  -1 -22  5 -26 
2004 0  -41  -20  -29  -46  -10 -39  5 -42 
a. NRAs including assistance to nontradables and non-product specific assistance.
 
b. NRAs including products specific input subsidies.  





t are the percentage NRAs for the tradables 
parts of the agricultural and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.   
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Appendix Table 7 (continued): Annual distortion estimates, Zambia, 1970 to 2004  
(c) Value shares of primary production of covered
a and non-covered products, (percent) 
   CottonGroundnut Maize Millet Rice Sorghum Soybean SunflowerTobacco VTobacco B Wheat
Non-
covered 
1961 na na 68 na na na na na 9 1 na 22
1962 na na 66 na na na na na 11 1 na 22
1963 na na 64 na na na na na 12 1 na 23
1964 na na 64 na na na na na 12 2 na 23
1965 1 15 55 na na na na na 10 1 na 19
1966 2 12 48 4 na 3 na na 7 0 0 24
1967 0 10 52 4 na 3 na 0700 2 3
1968 1 11 44504 n a0800 2 6
1 9 6 916 4 9202 n a0300 3 8
1970 2 16 40504 n a0600 2 6
1 9 7 119 5 0202 n a0300 3 1
1972 1 13 46502 n a0300 3 0
1973 1 18 3830200500 3 1
1974 0 10 5020101500 2 9
1 9 7 509 5 210200300 3 2
1976 1 16 4410101400 3 2
1 9 7 717 4 910100200 3 9
1 9 7 815 5 100100300 3 7
1 9 7 935 5 310101400 3 1
1 9 8 034 5 600102100 3 3
1 9 8 133 5 700113311 2 8
1 9 8 243 5 100116211 2 8
1 9 8 344 5 011116201 2 9
1 9 8 483 4 610123201 3 3
1 9 8 532 5 010112101 3 6
1 9 8 632 4 900211401 3 7
1 9 8 725 3 100120102 5 5
1 9 8 841 3 300110102 5 6
1 9 8 954 4 100120102 4 4
1 9 9 036 3 100120113 5 1
1 9 9 156 3 401110116 4 4
1 9 9 256 3 521111218 3 7
1 9 9 357 4 120131113 3 4
1 9 9 436 4 631121102 3 4
1 9 9 546 4 731231113 2 7
1 9 9 634 5 210121001 3 3
1 9 9 778 4 021221214 3 1
1998 5 17 2710112222 3 9
1999 11 8 3510110213 3 5
2 0 0 058 4 310111213 3 4
2001 7 11 3310221225 3 4
2 0 0 279 3 510010234 3 7
2 0 0 346 3 410020675 3 4
2004 na na 44 1 na 0 6 na 5 6 3 35
Source: Authors’ spreadsheet 
a. At farmgate undistorted prices 